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The OECD's BEPS Project was a major attempt to harmonize tax principles
across jurisdictions and prevent tax-motivated artificial profit shifting. One portion
of the BEPS Project is Action 5's tax ruling transparency framework. High-profile
instances of tax avoidance, such as LuxLeaks and the Apple/Ireland state aid case,
have only elucidated the extent to which tax authorities can use rulings to facilitate
tax avoidance. However, it should not be expected that Action 5's tax ruling
transparency will materially curb the use of rulings to aid tax avoidance.
For Action 5's transparency framework to achieve its goal, it must either deter
countries from issuing favorable rulings that depart from the issuing country's tax
laws and principles and other international tax norms or deter firms from utilizing
these favorable rulings. This Comment argues that Action 5 does not have this
deterrent eﬀect. However, when tax ruling transparency is coupled with a
disgorgement mechanism, such as in E.U. state aid law enforcement, transparency is
likely to reduce the number of instances where tax rulings will serve as an eﬀective
tool to induce tax-motivated income shifting. As such, this Comment argues that a
disgorgement mechanism, analogous to E.U. state aid law enforcement but with a
diﬀerent substantive backdrop, should be implemented to eﬀectuate the desired
behavioral responses of Action 5's tax ruling transparency framework.
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INTRODUCTION
For decades, the taxation of cross-border income generating activities has
elicited signiﬁcant attention from governments and policy experts.1
1 When this Comment was in the editing process, some countries, including the United States, began
expressing their support for the proposed OECD Pillar 2 seeking to implement a “global minimum tax.”
See Daniel Bunn, Designing a Global Minimum Tax with Full Expensing, TAX FOUND. (Sept. 23, 2020),
https://taxfoundation.org/designing-a-global-minimum-tax-with-full-expensing [https://perma.cc/DZP6YG8B] (providing a brief summary of the global minimum tax proposal); Jeff Stein, Yellen Pushes Global
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Academics2 and policymakers3 have long been concerned about multinational
enterprises (MNEs) exploiting diﬀerences in countries’ tax laws to pay as
Minimum Tax as White House Eyes New Spending Plan, WASH. POST (Mar. 15, 2021, 11:55 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-policy/2021/03/15/yellen-pushes-global-minimum-tax-white-houseeyes-new-spending-plan [https://perma.cc/C2TY-QTED] (explaining the Biden administration’s interest
in a global minimum tax); Jan Strupczewski, EU Backs U.S. Call for Global Minimum Corporate Tax, but Rate
to Be Decided, REUTERS (APR. 6, 2021, 10:46 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-treasury-yelleneu/eu-backs-u-s-call-for-global-minimum-corporate-tax-but-rate-to-be-decided-idUSKBN2BT1YG
[https://perma.cc/GK6N-J8GX] (suggesting some E.U. support for the global minimum tax); Alan
Rappeport, Finance Ministers Meet in Venice to Finalize Global Tax Agreement, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/09/business/g20-global-minimum-tax.html [https://perma.cc/SY54JTDX] (explaining that 131 countries favor a global minimum tax framework). This Comment focuses on
the narrower issue of the effectiveness of the OECD BEPS Project’s Action 5 tax ruling transparency at
preventing artificial income shifting. It argues that transparency alone will not deter the use of tax rulings
to induce income shifting because, in part, existing measures to tax MNE’s artificially shifted income are
ineffective. See infra notes 187–92 and accompanying text. The global minimum tax is certainly relevant to
this Comment’s analysis because theoretically it would impose a layer of tax on income shifted due to a
ruling and thus make this shifting less desirable. Nevertheless, this Comment’s analysis and proposal
remain relevant notwithstanding the global minimum tax proposal for two reasons.
First, dissenters from the global minimum tax may interfere with the efficacy of the proposal.
See Rappeport, supra (explaining that some low-tax jurisdictions, such as Ireland, have not agreed to
the proposal and providing a U.S. lawmaker’s remarks that the proposal “would be dead on arrival in
Congress”). Second, even if a global minimum tax is widely adopted, the issues analyzed in this
Comment would still be prevalent. As this Comment discusses, tax rulings have been used and are
likely to still be used to induce MNEs to artificially shift income to countries that issue the rulings
to provide the MNEs a low effective tax rate. See infra subsection I.A.2. The global minimum tax
would simply set a floor as to this effective tax rate. However, with some countries seeking to raise
their corporate tax rates, the differential between the corporate rate and the global minimum tax rate
could be large. Compare Johanna Hey, GloBE: Do We Need a Super-CFC?, KLUWER INT’L TAX BLOG
(Nov. 4, 2020), http://kluwertaxblog.com/2020/11/04/globe-do-we-need-a-super-cfc-forthcomingintertax-vol-49-2021-issue-1 [https://perma.cc/UC8F-NC8C] (suggesting that the global minimum
tax rate would be between 10% and 15%), with Garrett Watson, Huaqun Li & Taylor LaJoie; Details
and Analysis of President Joe Biden’s Tax Plan, TAX FOUND. (Oct. 22, 2020),
https://taxfoundation.org/joe-biden-tax-plan-2020 [https://perma.cc/SWN3-CCVZ] (explaining
President Biden’s goal of raising the U.S. corporate tax rate from 21% to 28%). And this differential
would incentivize countries to shift income to low-tax jurisdictions to pay the global minimum tax
rather than a higher rate of tax. Accordingly, as long as countries can use tax rulings to induce income
shifting, as this Comment suggests, this Comment’s proposal would remain useful to counter rulinginduced income shifting.
2 See, e.g., Carol A. Brittain, Tax Evasion Through International Manipulation of Foreign Exchange
Profits, 6 HASTINGS INT’L & COMPAR. L. REV. 719, 719-20 (1983) (detailing the manipulation of
funds by foreign banks to evade U.S. taxes); Tracy A. Kaye, The Oﬀshore Shell Game: U.S. Corporate
Tax Avoidance Through Profit Shifting, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 185, 186 (2014) (analyzing multinational tax
avoidance through manipulating intellectual property rights, debt, and transfer pricing); Edward D.
Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 700, 701-02 (2011) (explaining the ability of
multinational enterprises to generate income through foreign operations while avoiding taxation by
the countries where the income is derived).
3 See, e.g., JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R40623, TAX HAVENS: INTERNATIONAL
TAX AVOIDANCE AND EVASION 2 (2015) (noting several attempts by Congress to stem corporate tax
avoidance accomplished through international income shifting); Matti Ylönen, Back from Oblivion? The
Rise and Fall of the Early Initiatives Against Tax Avoidance from the 1960s and 1980s, 23 TRANSNAT’L CORPS.,
no. 3, 2016, at 33, 38 (discussing OECD efforts in 1956 to address international tax avoidance); Amy
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little tax on income as possible. Corporate inversions4 and other transactions
with names such as the “Double Irish With a Dutch Sandwich”5 have only
illuminated the ease by which MNEs can shift income and either defer or
completely eliminate tax liability. Countries trying to prevent this taxmotivated income shifting often seem to be playing a fruitless game of
“whack-a-mole” as new tax avoidance strategies replace the old.6
While in many instances countries may feel slighted by taxpayers’ eﬀorts
to avoid taxation, in other instances countries intentionally facilitate
opportunities for MNEs to reduce their tax liabilities.7 Because decreasing an
MNE’s tax liability is equivalent to providing a direct cash subsidy, countries
have intentionally adopted favorable tax regimes to induce ﬁrms to shift
income to those countries. Countries that successfully facilitate income
shifting raise a sliver of tax revenue on this income they could not otherwise
obtain absent such shifting. Much of this tax competition, however, involves
only artiﬁcial income shifting rather than an increase in economic activity.
And countries sometimes induce this income shifting by select taxpayers
using a seemingly mundane aspect of tax administration: tax rulings. Tax
rulings8 are a tax administration’s stance on the proper application of tax laws
to a particular transaction. To obtain a ruling, the taxpayer typically submits
a ruling request to the tax administration explaining the general structure of
Dunbar, Ted Black, Andrew Duxbury & Thomas Schultz, Income-Shifting by U.S. Multinational Corporations
in PAPERS GIVEN AT THE 7TH ANNUAL JOINT RESEARCH CONFERENCE ON TAX ADMINISTRATION
4, 4 (Alan Plumley ed., 2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/17rescondunbar.pdf [https://perma.cc/XP4VP5WQ] (analyzing income shifting allowed by federal tax laws).
4 A corporate inversion involves a corporation merging with and into another corporation that
has residence in a diﬀerent tax jurisdiction. CONG. BUDGET OFF., AN ANALYSIS OF CORPORATE
INVERSIONS 1 (2017), https://www.cbo.gov/system/ﬁles/115th-congress-2017-2018/reports/53093inversions.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7FS-KNP9]. Inversions alter the way in which a corporation is
taxed. Whereas multinational corporations with a U.S. parent corporation are taxed by the U.S. on
both domestic and foreign income, multinational corporations with a foreign parent only pay tax on
income earned in the U.S. Id.
5 Charles Duhigg & David Kocieniewski, How Apple Sidesteps Billions in Taxes, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 28, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/29/business/apples-tax-strategy-aims-at-low-taxstates-and-nations.html [https://perma.cc/YGN4-PTVV].
6 See Paul Caron, Companies Save Billions in Taxes by Shifting Assets Around Globe, WALL ST. J.
(Apr. 8, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/companies-save-billions-in-taxes-byshifting-assets-around-globe-11586347201 [https://perma.cc/Q4TM-53A2] (noting that despite
attempts of countries to “tighten the tax net,” MNEs are avoiding income tax by shifting intangible
assets to foreign subsidiaries).
7 See ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV. [OECD], HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION: AN
EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE ¶ 4 (1998), https://www.oecd.org/ctp/harmful/1904176.pdf [https://
perma.cc/K4NJ-PZVQ] [hereinafter OECD, 1998 REPORT] (“[T]ax havens and harmful preferential tax
regimes . . . affect the location of financial and other service activities, erode the tax bases of other
countries, distort trade and investment patterns and undermine the fairness, neutrality and broad social
acceptance of tax systems generally.”).
8 For the purposes of this Comment, the use of the general term “tax rulings” also includes
advanced pricing agreements (APAs). For a description of APAs, see infra note 38.
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the transaction at issue and how it thinks the relevant tax laws apply. The tax
administration, such as the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), then responds
with a ruling. Rulings may be adverse to taxpayers9 or beneﬁcial to them.10
And rulings can go beyond merely clarifying the proper application of tax
laws to a particular transaction by serving as a means to also eﬀectively
impose a taxpayer-favored tax liability, often signiﬁcantly departing from the
substance of the applicable tax laws.
LuxLeaks and the Apple/Ireland state aid controversy have only further
highlighted countries’ use of tax rulings to induce income shifting. LuxLeaks
involved a 2014 report by the International Consortium of Investigative
Journalists detailing Luxembourg’s habitual practice of issuing incredibly
taxpayer-favored rulings intended to remain conﬁdential.11 The report details
the complex ﬁnancial structures involving Luxembourg subsidiaries that, by
virtue of the tax rulings granted, reduced MNEs’ eﬀective tax rates below
one percent.12 Similarly, the Apple/Ireland state aid case showed that Apple
avoided roughly €13 billion in taxes by attributing the majority of its
international sales to Irish subsidiaries then, by virtue of an Irish tax ruling,
allocating most of the proﬁts to diﬀerent Apple subsidiaries that were not
subject to any tax.13
In response to widespread artiﬁcial income shifting, such as that involved
in LuxLeaks and the Apple/Ireland case, the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) launched its Base Erosion and
9 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 77-226, 1977-2 C.B. 90 (treating a share buyback and subsequent sale of the
remaining shares to third parties as a single redemption to disallow a dividends received deduction
and a short-term capital loss).
10 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 74-565, 1974-2 C.B. 125 (disregarding a transitory subsidiary in a failed
§ 368(a)(2)(E) reorganization to allow for a tax-free reorganization under § 368(a)(1)(B) although
the form of the transaction does not technically comply with the latter provision).
11 See generally Luxembourg Leaks: Global Companies’ Secrets Exposed, I NT ’ L C ONSORTIUM
OF I NVESTIGATIVE J OURNALISTS , https://www.icij.org/investigations/luxembourg-leaks
[https://perma.cc/44PH-7UBR].
12 Id.
13 See Commission Decision 2017/1283 of 30 Aug. 2016 on State Aid SA.38373 (2014/C) (ex
2014/NN) (ex 2014/CP) Implemented by Ireland to Apple, 2017 O.J. (L 187) 1; see also Press Release,
Eur. Comm’n, State Aid: Ireland Gave Illegal Tax Benefits to Apple Worth Up to €13 Billion, (Aug. 30, 2016),
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/api/files/document/print/en/ip_16_2923/IP_16_2923_EN.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3BCR-MTKD]. Although the European Commission found that the rulings
constituted state aid, Apple and Ireland ultimately won the dispute on appeal. See Case T-892/16, Apple
Sales Int’l v. Comm’n, ECLI:EU:T:2020:338 (July 15, 2020); Ryan Finley, EU Court Rules Against
European Commission in Apple State Aid Case, 99 TAX NOTES INT’L 301, 301 (2020) (“The General
Court’s decision . . . invalidates the commission’s largest state aid recovery order . . . .”). The
Commission has announced that it will appeal the GCEU’s decision. See Commission Statement
STATEMENT/20/1746, Statement by Executive Vice-President Margrethe Vestager on the
Commission’s Decision to Appeal the General Court’s Judgment on the Apple Tax State Aid Case in
Ireland (Sept. 25, 2020), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_20_1746
[https://perma.cc/6BU6-AS6V].
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Proﬁt Shifting (BEPS) Project. BEPS refers generally to tax avoidance
strategies whereby taxpayers shift income to tax favored locations without an
associated shift of economic activity, which the OECD estimates deplete
countries’ tax revenues by $100-240 billion annually.14 The OECD/G20 BEPS
Project,15 through its myriad policy tools called “Actions,” attempts to combat
this type of tax avoidance by harmonizing tax principles across countries and
creating minimum standards to which participating countries must adhere.16
While the OECD BEPS Project focuses on ending many tax avoidance
strategies, Action 5 speciﬁcally addresses the issue of tax rulings by requiring
all participating countries to exchange, or share, those rulings with countries
whose tax bases may be aﬀected by the tax rulings issued.17
The OECD18 and other commentators have argued that the OECD
BEPS Project’s tax ruling transparency can adequately prevent countries
from using rulings to grant unwarranted tax concessions.19 But others have
questioned the ability of transparency to have any eﬀect given that there are
no repercussions for countries that deviate from Action 5’s tax ruling
transparency minimum standards.20 These latter commentators’ conclusions
What Is BEPS?, OECD, https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/about [https://perma.cc/398Y-JCNT].
BEPS Actions, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/beps-actions [https://perma.cc/L32X-7AEN].
Id.
See generally OECD, COUNTERING HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES MORE EFFECTIVELY,
TAKING INTO ACCOUNT TRANSPARENCY AND SUBSTANCE: ACTION 5 – 2015 FINAL REPORT
(2015) [hereinafter OECD, ACTION 5 – 2015 FINAL REPORT].
18 See OECD, OECD/G20 INCLUSIVE FRAMEWORK ON BEPS: PROGRESS REPORT JULY
2019–JULY 2020, at 16 (2020) [hereinafter OECD, 2019–2020 PROGRESS REPORT] (“[T]ransparency
continues to deter tax administrations and taxpayers from engaging in rulings practices that may
give rise to BEPS concerns.”); OECD, OECD/G20 INCLUSIVE FRAMEWORK ON BEPS:
PROGRESS REPORT JULY 2018–MAY 2019, at 9 (2019) [hereinafter OECD, 2018–2019 PROGRESS
REPORT] (noting that tax ruling transparency should eliminate the prevalence of “‘sweetheart
deals’” between MNEs and countries).
19 See, e.g., Thomas Neubig, Global Tax Administration Initiatives Addressing Tax Evasion and
Avoidance, 91 TAX NOTES INT’L 1137, 1140 (2018) (“[T]ransparency . . . will discourage the most
egregious tax planning activity of MNEs . . . .”); Mindy Herzfeld, News Analysis, Luxembourg Plans
for a Post-BEPS World, 81 TAX NOTES INT’L 908, 908 (2016) (“[T]he automatic exchange of rulings
adversely impacts jurisdictions where taxpayers depended heavily on rulings to conﬁrm tax
positions.”); Stuart Gibson, EU State Aid; More Cracks in the Wall of Secrecy, 80 TAX NOTES INT’L
473, 473 (2015) (“Combined with the ﬁnal report on action 5 of the OECD’s BEPS [P]roject . . . the
world seems to have built a solid foundation not only to combat base erosion and proﬁt shifting, but
also to give all tax administrations the tools to detect such abuse.”).
20 See, e.g., Allison Christians, BEPS and the New International Tax Order, 2016 BYU L. REV.
1603, 1632 (noting that there is no imposition of penalties or prohibitions for issuing preferential tax
treatment through tax rulings); Itai Grinberg, The New International Tax Diplomacy, 104 GEO. L.J.
1137, 1166 (2016) (considering tax ruling transparency and noting that “[c]oordinated implementation
of any kind or substantial improvements in cross-border administrative assistance . . . will prove
challenging in the absence of any enforcement mechanism”); Carlo Biz, Countering Tax Avoidance at
the EU Level After “LuxLeaks”: A History of Tax Rulings, Transparency and BEPS: Base Erosion Profit
Shifting or Bending European Perspective Solutions?, 7 DIRITTO E PRACTICA TRIBUTARIA
14
15
16
17
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are correct.21 The OECD BEPS Project’s tax ruling transparency alone will
not change ﬁrm or country behavior because exposing tax avoidance does not
reduce its net beneﬁts to either countries or ﬁrms. And participating
countries do not seem to heed the OECD’s 2018 recommendation to impose
sanctions on ﬁrms that improperly utilize “preferential regimes.”22 In fact, the
2018 recommendation is so fundamentally ﬂawed that it does not warrant any
serious consideration with respect to Action 5’s behavioral implications.23
Accordingly, Action 5’s tax ruling transparency will not produce the results
envisioned by the OECD; namely, countries’ use of tax rulings to induce
income shifting.
However, tax ruling transparency may deter some tax-motivated income
shifting in the context of European Union’s state aid law.24 State aid law
generally bars the use of state resources to provide a competitive advantage

INTERNAZIONALE 1035, 1067 (“[T]ransparency is obviously not the longed for deus ex machina,
which can solve the extensive range of problems of the complex and hazy web that international tax
law is.”); Arkadiusz Myszkowski, Special Report, An Evaluation of BEPS Action 5, 81 TAX NOTES
INT’L 365, 371 (2016) (noting in regard to Action 5that “one can take only a pessimistic view when
non-exchange of rulings by tax authorities is not subject to any penalties at all”); see also id. (“[O]ne
can question whether tax authorities and MNEs will collude to avoid exchanging rulings.”).
Additional concerns outside the scope of this Comment also exist. See, e.g., id. at 369-70 (arguing
that the eﬃcacy of Action 5 depends on compliance by non-OECD member countries and noting
the difficulty the limited extent of such countries’ compliance with early OECD work on tax competition).
21 Their position is further substantiated by the OECD’s report in the summer of 2020
providing some empirical evidence that the BEPS Project as a whole has not had the intended eﬀect
of mitigating proﬁt shifting. See generally OECD, CORPORATE TAX STATISTICS 44 (2d ed. 2020)
(observing that OECD data suggests the existence of “BEPS channels” and the possibility of “a
misalignment between the location where proﬁts are reported and the location where economic
activities occur”); see also Ryan Finley, Country Digest, OECD’s CbC Reporting Data Show Ongoing
Profit Shifting, 99 TAX NOTES INT’L 268, 268 (2020) (“Aggregated data collected by the
OECD . . . suggest that the [OECD BEPS Project] hasn’t yet achieved its goal of aligning proﬁt
with value creation.”); New Corporate Tax Statistics Provide Fresh Insights into the Activities of
Multinational Enterprises, OECD (Aug. 7, 2020), https://www.oecd.org/tax/new-corporate-taxstatistics-provide-fresh-insights-into-the-activities-of-multinational-enterprises.htm
[https://perma.cc/9CM5-UNKZ] [hereinafter Fresh Insights] (noting that the compiled statistics are
“indicative of the existence of BEPS behaviour”).
22 For a discussion on preferential regimes, see infra notes 102–06 and accompanying text.
23 See infra note 151.
24 See, e.g., Saturnina Moreno González, State Aid and Tax Competition: Comments on the
European Commission’s Decisions on Transfer Pricing Rulings, 2016 EUR. STATE AID L.Q. 556, 574
(2016) (“[T]he opening of investigations into the tax ruling practices of the Member States as State
aid has served to bolster the BEPS Project in the European Union.”); see also Kevin Markle & Leslie
Robinson, Negotiated Tax Havens 11, 37 ﬁg.1 (Tuck Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 3280683, 2021),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3280683 (observing that in 2016 the
Commission began compiling aid expenditure data at the beneﬁciary level and graphically
demonstrating that the level of tax-related aid decreased relative to the total amount of aid granted
by Member States).
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to ﬁrms operating in E.U. Member States,25 and requires Member States to
recover such resources that violate this standard, referred to as unlawful aid.
State aid not only contemplates direct government outlays, but also the
reduction of ﬁrm tax liabilities through tax rulings.26 As such, any tax
concession that a Member State issues through a tax ruling is potentially
subject to disgorgement through the enforcement of state aid law.27
The OECD BEPS Project’s tax ruling transparency increases the
likelihood that the Member State who issued the ruling must recover, and
consequently the recipient MNE must surrender, the tax concession aﬀorded.
Increased transparency enables the European Commission—the body
responsible for enforcing state aid law—to more productively identify
unlawful state aid. This directly reduces the expected value of the tax
concession to the recipient MNE. Consequently, rulings become less
eﬀective at inducing tax-motivated income shifting, which can change
country and MNE behavior of issuing and accepting, respectively, tax
concessions aﬀorded by tax rulings. The possibility that an MNE may have
to surrender the tax concession in the European Union is the sole reason to
expect any behavioral changes following the implementation of Action 5’s tax
ruling transparency. Action 5’s behavioral impact can only stem E.U.
countries’ use of tax rulings to induce income shifting, however, because there
is no comparable disgorgement or penalty mechanism for countries outside
the European Union.
But even in the E.U. state aid context, tax ruling transparency will only
prove moderately eﬀective. State aid law, from a theoretical perspective, is
not well equipped to handle BEPS issues, and some state aid decisions
concerning tax rulings, such as the recent decision involving Apple,28
highlight some of its limitations. Merely extending state aid law to non-E.U.
countries, while perhaps theoretically tempting because of its existing
disgorgement mechanism, will not stem the use of tax rulings to facilitate tax
25 See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 107,
Sept. 5, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 87 [hereinafter TFEU].
26 Commission Notice on the Notion of State Aid as Referred to in Article 107(1) of the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union, 2016 O.J. 1, 36-37 [hereinafter Commission Notice on State Aid].
27 See Ruth Mason, Special Report, Tax Rulings as State Aid FAQ, 154 TAX NOTES 451, 452 (2017)
(positing that tax subsidies, necessarily including those granted through tax rulings, “easily satisfy” some
elements of illegal state aid and thus require the Commission to demonstrate the elements of advantage
and selectivity); EUR. COMM’N, COMPETITION: STATE AID PROCEDURES (2013),
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/factsheets/state_aid_procedures_en.pdf [https://
perma.cc/6L9M-7FPY] (explaining that when the European Commission takes a negative decision with
respect to aid already paid out, the Member State must recover the aid with interest from the beneficiary).
28 See Case T-892/16, Apple Sales Int’l v. Comm’n, ECLI:EU:T:2020:338, ¶ 505 (July 15, 2020)
(“[I]t must be concluded that the Commission did not succeed in showing, in the present instance,
that, by issuing the contested tax rulings, the Irish tax authorities had granted ASI and AOE [two
Apple subsidiaries] a selective advantage for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU.”).
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avoidance. The state aid cases that involve tax rulings and require
disgorgement of the aﬀorded tax concession rest on ﬂawed applications of
state aid law, as they implicitly disregard the fact that the tax ruling is the sole
reason the income shifting necessarily at issue occurred.29 As such, a BEPSfocused disgorgement mechanism,30 procedurally analogous to state aid law
enforcement but with a substantive foundation consisting of the OECD BEPS
Project Actions, other OECD guidelines, and the issuing country’s tax laws
is the best means for the OECD and countries participating in the OECD
BEPS Project adversely aﬀected by tax ruling-induced income shifting to
signiﬁcantly combat the use of tax rulings as a tax avoidance tool.
Although some commentators acknowledge that countries are not
incentivized to adhere to the OECD BEPS Project Actions, including Action
5, no work has addressed the shortcomings of tax ruling transparency using
formal economic methods. More importantly, theoretical economic
considerations are also absent in work mentioning the eﬃcacy of transparency
in the E.U. state aid context.31 As such, this Comment addresses this shortfall
in the literature on tax rulings by providing a theoretical analysis of the
behavioral implications of incorporating solely a transparency framework and
of incorporating a transparency framework coupled with the possibility of
surrendering undue tax concessions. As a result of the theoretical conclusions,
this Comment proposes that the OECD form a BEPS-focused disgorgement
mechanism analogous to E.U. state aid law to accompany Action 5’s
transparency framework because tax ruling transparency will only trigger
behavioral responses when there is a possibility that the tax concession
aﬀorded through the ruling may be subject to disgorgement.
This Comment is structured as follows. Part I provides a general overview
of tax rulings, their use to facilitate BEPS strategies, and the OECD’s work
to combat such uses of tax rulings. Part II then provides a theoretical analysis
of expected behavioral consequences from the introduction of Action 5’s
transparency framework in both the presence and absence of an existing
29 See infra notes 273–80 and accompanying text. An acknowledgement in these cases that the
tax ruling was the necessary condition to induce the income shifting at issue would lead to the
conclusion that the relevant Member State did not use state resources to provide a competitive
advantage to the ﬁrm receiving the challenged tax concession. See Adrien Giraud & Sylvain Petit,
Tax Rulings and State Aid Qualification: Should Reality Matter?, 2017 EUR. STATE AID L.Q. 233, 234
(2017) (observing that MNEs “enjoy a great deal of discretion” as to where they shift income and
positing that, in the case of Ireland and Apple, “Ireland’s tax authorities negotiated Apple’s taxable
basis precisely because Apple had the possibility of shifting the corresponding revenues elsewhere
if a satisfying compromise was not found”); infra notes 278–80 and accompanying text.
30 All references to a “BEPS-focused disgorgement mechanism” mean a disgorgement
mechanism structured to address general BEPS issues. For a detailed description of the proposed
BEPS-focused disgorgement mechanism, see infra Section III.B.
31 See Neubig, supra note 19, at 1148 (“No studies have been done on the eﬀect of transparency
on government rulings, which is addressed in the harmful tax practice BEPS Action 5.”).
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disgorgement mechanism. This Part concludes that desired behavioral
responses to tax ruling transparency occur only when tax concessions aﬀorded
through rulings are potentially subject to disgorgement. Part III proposes a
disgorgement mechanism in the context of the OECD BEPS Project. This
Part analyzes the substantive and procedural aspects of E.U. state aid law and
then argues that state aid law is inadequate to handle general BEPS issues. It
concludes by outlining a general structure of a BEPS-focused disgorgement
mechanism, with OECD BEPS Project Action items, other OECD work on
tax matters, and the issuing country’s tax laws serving as the substantive backdrop.
I. TAX RULINGS, TAX COMPETITION, AND THE OECD BEPS
PROJECT
Countries use tax rulings to effectively administer tax laws, and sometimes
to compete for foreign investment. The OECD recognized in the 1980s that
tax competition can distort economic decisions and lead to harmful tax
consequences.32 More recently, the OECD recognized the role of tax rulings
in effectuating harmful tax competition. As a result, the OECD formally
addressed tax rulings as a tool for tax avoidance in the OECD BEPS Project.
A. An Overview of Tax Rulings and Their Potentially “Harmful” Uses
Tax rulings are commonplace in modern tax systems. They provide
guidance on the applicable tax treatment for many, though not all,33 types of
transactions. However, taxpayers and tax administrations also use tax rulings
to provide favorable tax treatment to speciﬁc taxpayers. Some of these
favorable rulings induce taxpayers to artiﬁcially shift income, which does not
require a shift in economic activity but does deplete the tax bases of other countries.
1. Tax Rulings: Their Purpose and Uses
Tax rulings are pronouncements by tax authorities to taxpayers that
provide guidance on how a given transaction or structure will be taxed.34
32 Andrew P. Morriss & Lotta Moberg, Cartelizing Taxes: Understanding the OECD’s Campaign
Against “Harmful Tax Competition,” 4 COLUM. J. TAX L. 1, 33 (2012).
33 See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 2020-1, 2020-1 I.R.B. 18-23 (listing types of transactions where the IRS
will not issue a tax ruling).
34 See OECD, ACTION 5 – 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, ¶ 95 (“Rulings are ‘any advice,
information or undertaking provided by a tax authority to a speciﬁc taxpayer or group of taxpayers
concerning their tax situation and on which they are entitled to rely.’”) (quoting OECD,
CONSOLIDATED APPLICATION NOTE: GUIDANCE IN APPLYING THE 1998 REPORT TO
PREFERENTIAL TAX REGIMES ¶ 161 (2004)); see also ELLY VAN DE VELDE, ‘TAX RULINGS’ IN
THE EU MEMBER STATES 6 (2015); Lilian V. Faulhaber, The Trouble with Tax Competition: From
Practice to Theory, 71 TAX L. REV. 311, 333 (2018).
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Generally, tax rulings fall into two broad classifications. The first type is
taxpayer-specific rulings. These rulings apply to a specific taxpayer and
typically entitle that taxpayer to rely on the ruling.35 Tax authorities can issue
these rulings either before or after a transaction.36 Pre-transaction rulings are
more common than post-transaction rulings37 and can further be characterized
as advance tax rulings and advanced pricing agreements (APAs).38 In addition
to taxpayer-specific rulings, the second broad classification is a general ruling.
Rather than applying to a specific taxpayer, general rulings apply to groups or
types of taxpayers or to a defined set of circumstances.39
Tax rulings are crucial to eﬀectively administer tax laws. Because tax laws
and regulations are complex and sometimes vague, the taxpayer’s judgment
may be inadequate to predict the tax consequences of a contemplated
structure or transaction.40 Rulings provide administrative eﬃciency by
solidifying the tax consequences of transactions or structures.41 This reduces
the likelihood of future conﬂict or litigation between tax authorities and
taxpayers.42 For instance, private letter rulings43 bind the relevant tax

OECD, ACTION 5 – 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, ¶ 97.
Id.
See id. ¶ 98 (“Typically, the taxpayer concerned will make an application for a ruling before
undertaking the transaction concerned . . . .”).
38 APAs are arrangements that determine “in advance of controlled transactions, an
appropriate set of criteria . . . for the determination of the transfer pricing for those transactions
over a ﬁxed period of time.” Id. ¶ 99 (quoting OECD, OECD TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES
FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND TAX ADMINISTRATORS § 4.123 (2010)). These rulings
are more stringent than ordinary advance tax rulings in that determinations typically require
veriﬁcation of the factual assumptions on which the legal determinations are based. Id. ¶ 100.
39 Id. ¶ 102; see, e.g., supra notes 9–10.
40 VAN DE VELDE, supra note 34, § 1.1.2.
41 Id.; see also Biz, supra note 20, at 1038; Pierpaolo Rossi-Maccanico, Special Report, Fiscal Aid,
Tax Competition, and BEPS, 75 TAX NOTES INT’L 857, 866 (2014) (“A unilateral APA . . . gives the
taxpayer’s group legal certainty of the taxation of intragroup transactions . . . .”); Yehonatan Givati,
Resolving Legal Uncertainty: The Unfulfilled Promise of Advance Tax Rulings 29 VA. TAX REV. 137, 147
(2009) (“The advance ruling process is understood to be important for many reasons, but especially
because taxpayers can achieve legal certainty regarding the tax consequences of contemplated
transactions by using it.”).
42 See INT’L MONETARY FUND & OECD, Tax Certainty: IMF/OECD Report for the G20
Finance Ministers 37 (Mar. 2017) [hereinafter IMF/OECD REPORT] (noting that ruling regimes are
within the set of tools identiﬁed to have the largest impact in avoiding tax disputes).
43 In the U.S., private letter rulings are written statements issued by the IRS describing how the
tax laws apply to the taxpayer’s specific facts. Understanding IRS Guidance – A Brief Primer, INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/understanding-irs-guidance-a-brief-primer [https://
perma.cc/XYG9-VGKU] (last updated Sept. 24, 2020).
35
36
37
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authority in many jurisdictions,44 including the IRS in the United States.45
Regardless of whether the ruling legally binds the tax authority, taxpayers can
generally rely on rulings, so long as they structure their transaction in
accordance with the facts in the ruling.46 As the number of tax disputes rises
globally,47 many experts unsurprisingly view tax rulings as “an indispensable
tool in the modern world of tax administration and compliance.”48
While not intrinsically problematic, tax rulings may also facilitate
“harmful” tax practices. Because rulings can be taxpayer-speciﬁc, they allow
issuing countries to grant favorable tax treatment to individual taxpayers.49
As a result, recipients of rulings that oﬀer favorable tax treatment shift their
income to those locations. But this income shifting is not associated with a
comparable increase in economic activity.50 This produces a mismatch
between where income is earned and where it is taxed.
Such income shifts can also adversely impact other countries, whose
taxable base is reduced as income is shifted into jurisdictions that issue
favorable tax rulings.51 This tax base depletion can occur in any tax system. In

44 See Cory Hillier & Christophe Waerzeggers, Introducing an Advance Tax Ruling (ATR)
Regime, TAX L. IMF TECHN. NOTE, May 2016, at 1, 1 (noting that private tax rulings typically
“bind[] the tax authority in relation to the arrangement for which it is issued”); see also IMF/OECD
REPORT, supra note 42, at 53 (“[A] private ruling is usually binding only for a particular transaction.”).
45 See Understanding IRS Guidance, supra note 43 (“A [private letter ruling] is binding on the
IRS if the taxpayer fully and accurately described the proposed transaction in the request and carries
out the transaction as described.”)
46 OECD, ACTION 5 – 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, ¶ 98.
47 See Global Tax Disputes Update, KPMG (July 2019), https://home.kpmg/xx/en/home/
insights/2019/07/global-tax-disputes-update-july-2019.html [https://perma.cc/KED9-PCME] (“[T]ax audit
and dispute activity [is] rising in almost every country . . . .”).
48 Biz, supra note 20, at 1038 (quoting Maarten J. Ellis, General Report, 84b CAHIERS DE DROIT
FISCAL INTERNATIONAL 21, 24 (1999)).
49 See Grinberg, supra note 20, at 1164 (noting that the purpose of the OECD BEPS Project
Action 5’s spontaneous exchange of tax rulings is to “cabin special tax deals” between foreign MNEs
and countries); Nina Hrushko, Note, Tax in the World of Antitrust Enforcement: European Commission’s
State Aid Investigations into EU Member States’ Tax Rulings, 43 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 327, 338 (2017)
(explaining that tax rulings can constitute illegal state aid, which necessarily requires a selective advantage).
50 Jeﬀrey Owens, The David H. Tillinghast Lecture—Tax Competition: To Welcome or Not, 65 TAX
L. REV. 173, 180 (2012) (distinguishing between investment and taxable proﬁts and explaining
methods to reduce taxable income in jurisdictions where the income is earned); see also OECD, 1998
REPORT, supra note 7, at 30 (noting that the “[i]nappropriate use of advanced rulings
and . . . individual negotiated agreements can . . . distort the competitive position of countries”).
51 See supra note 7; see also Samuel Johnston, Multilateral Tax Convention to Prevent Base Erosion
and Profit Shifting, 23 AUCKLAND U. L. REV. 384, 384 (2017) (“This issue is referred to as base
erosion and proﬁt shifting (BEPS)—the tax bases of high tax jurisdictions are eroded and proﬁts
are shifted to low or no tax jurisdictions.”); Kerrie Sadiq, Adrian Sawyer & Bronwyn McCredie,
Jurisdictional Responses to Base Erosion and Profit Shifting: A Study of 19 Key Domestic Tax Systems, 16
EJOURNAL TAX RSCH. 737, 752 (2019) (noting that resident entities can “strip the tax base” of their
resident country by holding an interest in a foreign ﬁrm).
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“worldwide” tax systems, residents are taxed on their global earnings.52
Residence country tax bases decrease because MNEs can operate through
foreign entities to both utilize favorable rulings and defer immediate
residence-country taxation by avoiding provisions that attribute foreign
subsidiary earnings to the resident MNE. In systems more akin to
“territorial” tax systems that generally exempt foreign source income from
tax,53 residence-country tax base depletion occurs because MNEs can operate
through foreign entities that derive income that is generally exempt from
residence-country tax while also avoiding the tax system’s provisions that are
more akin to those in a worldwide system, with rulings incentivizing MNEs
to shift income so that it is not sourced to the resident country. Therefore,
the favorable tax treatment provided by rulings can induce income shifting to
the detriment of other countries’ tax bases.
While potentially harmful to residence countries’ tax bases, these income
shifting strategies are desirable from an MNE’s perspective. Shifting income
to a low-tax jurisdiction and avoiding residence country taxation eﬀectively
allows the MNE to achieve “double non-taxation,” or negligible tax liability
that is due immediately to the residence country and to the country to which
the MNE shifted its income.54 Although income shifting does not require tax
rulings,55 tax rulings exacerbate the phenomenon by eﬀectively allowing for
individualized tax liabilities56 and creating opportunities for tax avoidance
that were either nonexistent or not as attractive without a tax ruling.

52 KYLE POMERLEAU, A HYBRID APPROACH: THE TREATMENT OF FOREIGN PROFITS UNDER
THE TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT 2 (2018), https://files.taxfoundation.org/20180502205047/Tax-Foundation-

FF586.pdf [https://perma.cc/QJ9Y-8HE9].
53 Id. at 3. A “pure” territorial system entirely exempts foreign source income from residence
country tax. See id. at 2. Most OECD countries have hybrid systems with aspects of both worldwide
and territorial systems. Id.
54 OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING 15 (2013) [hereinafter
OECD, BEPS ACTION PLAN] (observing that the interaction of different countries’ tax rules can
reduce or eliminate tax liability); see also Christian Kahlenberg, Prevention of Double Non-taxation: An
Analysis of Cross-Border Financing from a German Perspective, 43 INTERTAX 218, 218 (2015) (recognizing
MNEs’ tax planning strategies to shift income to “tax havens,” which leads to double non-taxation);
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (“BEPS”), PWC (Sept. 25, 2019), https://perma.cc/FY9W-VCEL
(explaining that base erosion and profit schemes often lead to double non-taxation).
55 See What Is BEPS?, supra note 14 (noting that income shifting can result from discrepancies
between diﬀerent countries’ tax laws).
56 See Markle & Robinson, supra note 24, at 11 (“In several cases, the deals—known as ‘tax rulings’—
allowed firms to pay tax in Luxembourg at a rate of less than 1 percent.”); Commission Decision of 11 June
2014, State Aid SA/38373 (2014/C)(ex 2014/NN)(ex 2014/CP)—Ireland Alleged Aid to Apple, ¶¶ 36-37, C(2014)
3606 final, https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/253200/253200_1582634_87_2.pdf [https://
perma.cc/C3L4-X8S9] (providing an excerpt of a conversation between Irish tax authorities and Apple
representatives explicitly referring to a negotiated taxable income figure).
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2. Tax Rulings and Tax Competition: An Analysis of the Apple/Ireland
State Aid Case
The previous subsection detailed the general types of tax rulings and how
they can be used to eﬀectuate tax avoidance. The Apple/Ireland state aid case
illustrates the operation of rulings, the types of transactions and structures
involved, the means for MNEs to artiﬁcially shift income, and the ability of
rulings to immediately reduce tax liability.
Apple Inc. is a U.S.-based technology company that primarily sells
consumer technology goods.57 Since 1980, Apple Inc. has organized its sales
by allocating them between two separate regions. The U.S.-based Apple Inc.
handles sales in the Americas while Apple Sales International coordinates
Apple’s sales eﬀorts in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, India, Asia, and the
Paciﬁc.58 Apple Sales International is an Irish-incorporated entity and a direct
subsidiary of Apple Operations Europe.59 Apple Operations Europe is the
Irish subsidiary of Apple Operations International, which is an Irish
incorporated entity ultimately owned by Apple Inc.60 Apple Operations
Europe is primarily responsible for manufacturing certain lines of Apple
products.61 Although Apple Sales International and Apple Operations
Europe are both Irish-incorporated entities ultimately owned by U.S.-based
Apple Inc., they are both stateless for tax purposes as they are neither tax
residents of Ireland or the U.S.62 Because countries generally only have the
right to tax entities with tax residency in that country,63 neither Ireland nor
the U.S. could tax Apple Sales International and Apple Operations Europe.

57 See Memorandum from Sen. Carl Levin, Chairman, & Sen. John McCain, Ranking
Minory Member, Permanent Subcomm. On Investigations, to Members of the Permanent
Subcomm. On Investigations, Offshore Profit Shifting and the U.S. Tax Code—Part 2 (Apple
Inc.), at 17 (May 21, 2013), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/EXHIBIT%201a%20%20Subcommittee%20Memo%20on%20Oﬀshore%20Proﬁt%20Shifting%20&%20Apple%20(May%
2021%202013).pdf [https://perma.cc/T3VG-WW42] (“Apple is a personal computer and technology
company specializing in the design and sale of computers, mobile telephones, and other hightechnology personal goods.”).
58 Commission Decision 2017/1283, supra note 13, at 5-6 ¶¶ 40-46.
59 Id. at ¶ 47 & ﬁg.1.
60 Id.
61 Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, supra note 13, at 2.
62 See Commission Decision 2017/1283, supra note 13, at 7 ¶ 52 (“During the time that the
contested tax rulings were in force, ASI and AOE could therefore be best described as ‘stateless’ for
tax residency purposes.”); see also Levin & McCain, supra note 57, at 23-24 (noting that these entities
do not have any tax residency because they do not meet Ireland’s “management and control” test of
residency or the “place of formation” residency requirement of the United States).
63 A country can tax income of nonresidents if the source of the nonresident’s income is that
country. For example, the United States taxes foreign entities on items of income if the source of
that income is the U.S. E.g., I.R.C. §§ 861-65, 882, 884, 1442 (providing for U.S. taxation of foreign
corporations for U.S. source items of income).
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The E.U. state aid case initiated by the European Commission involved
tax rulings that Ireland issued in 1991 and 2007 to both Apple Sales
International and Apple Operations Europe.64 The rulings authorized both
entities to internally allocate their income between themselves and their
respective Irish branch oﬃces.65 The 1991 ruling to Apple Operations
Europe66 provided that the net proﬁt attributable to its branch oﬃce would
be the sum of 65% of Apple Operation Europe’s operating expenses up to
$60-70 million and 20% of such expenses in excess of $60-70 million.67 The
2007 ruling revised the proﬁt determination for the branch oﬃce to be a 1015% margin on Apple Operation Europe’s operating costs, excluding certain
costs, plus a ﬁxed 1-5% return on its intellectual property.68 The 1991 ruling
to Apple Sales International69 provided that net proﬁt attributable to its
branch oﬃce for tax purposes would be 12.5% of Apple Sales International’s
operating costs, excluding certain costs.70 The 2007 ruling changed the
percentage from 12.5% to 10-15%.71 Apple Operations Europe and Apple Sales
International allocated their remaining earnings to their respective “head
oﬃces,” which were non-Irish residents for tax purposes.72
The rulings that Ireland issued to Apple Sales International and Apple
Operations Europe signiﬁcantly decreased each entity’s respective tax
liabilities. Each year in which the rulings applied, Ireland only taxed the
proﬁts allocated to the branch oﬃces of Apple Sales International and Apple
Operations Europe.73 However, the branch oﬃce proﬁts were signiﬁcantly
less than proﬁts allocated to the head oﬃces. For example, in 2011 Apple Sales
International recorded total proﬁts of roughly €16 billion, but because of the
ruling, Ireland taxed approximately €50 million.74 As a result, the eﬀective tax
rate on Apple Sales International’s proﬁts was consistently below Ireland’s
statutory tax rate of 12.5% and from 2011 to 2014, for example, ranged from
0.05% in 2011 to 0.005% in 2014.75

Commission Decision 2017/1283, supra note 13, at 5 ¶ 39.
Id.
At the time Apple Operations Europe was Apple Computer Ltd. Id. at 9 ¶ 61.
Id. at 9-10 ¶ 61.
Id. at 10 ¶ 62.
At the time Apple Sales International was Apple Computer Accessories Ltd. Id. at 9 ¶ 59.
Id.
Id. at 9 ¶ 60.
Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, supra note 13, at 1 (“These proﬁts allocated to the ‘head oﬃces’
were not subject to tax in any country under speciﬁc provisions of the Irish tax law, which are no
longer in force.”).
73 See Commission Decision of 11 June 2014, supra note 56, ¶¶ 21-24 (providing data on taxed
proﬁts from Apple Sales International’s and Apple Operations Europe’s branch oﬃces).
74 Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, supra note 13, at 2.
75 See id.
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
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But why would Apple want to decrease its Irish tax liability? The U.S.based Apple ultimately owns the Irish entities, and U.S. residents are subject
to tax on their worldwide income.76 As a result, one may suspect that Apple
would owe U.S. tax on the Irish earnings of its subsidiaries, less a credit for
Irish taxes paid.77 And because the Irish tax liability was relatively small, the
U.S. tax would be relatively large. However, as mentioned, U.S. based MNEs
can avoid U.S. income tax liability on proﬁts earned outside the U.S., which
is precisely what Apple did. In eﬀect, these rulings aﬀorded Apple a relatively
low current Irish tax liability while it deferred its U.S. tax liability by shifting
income to its Irish subsidiaries.
Because tax rulings set Apple’s Irish tax so low, Apple shifted its income
to both utilize the favorable eﬀective rate aﬀorded by the rulings and to
circumvent the Internal Revenue Code (Code).78 This income-shifting
structure enabled Apple to defer U.S. income tax liability on its Irish
subsidiaries’ earnings. A detailed explanation of this structure is helpful to
fully appreciate the utility and mechanics of international income shifting for
Apple, and U.S.-based MNEs in general, and tax rulings’ role in this shifting.
Although U.S. residents are subject to U.S. income tax on their worldwide
incomes, foreign subsidiaries are respected by the Code as entities that are
separate from their U.S. parent companies. As such, foreign subsidiary
income is generally not taxable until there is a “recognition event,”79 such as

76 See I.R.C. § 61(a) (“[G]ross income means all income from whatever source derived . . . .”);
Treas. Reg. § 1.1-1(b) (as amended in 2008) (“[A]ll citizens of the United States . . . are liable to the
income taxes imposed by the Code whether the income is received from sources within or without
the United States.”); see also Joseph B. Darby III & Kelsey Lemaster, Double Irish More than Doubles
the Tax Savings, PRAC. US/INT’L TAX STRATEGIES, May 15, 2007, at 2, 2 (noting that domestic
corporations are subject to U.S. income tax on their worldwide income).
77 See I.R.C. § 901(a), (b)(1) (providing a credit for income taxes paid to a foreign country
during the taxable year); see also Tax Convention, Ir.-U.S., art. 29(2)(a), July 28, 1997, S. TREATY
DOC. No. 105-31 (1997) (“This Convention shall enter into force . . . in respect of taxes withheld at
source, for amounts paid or credited . . . .”).
78 The following description of Apple’s tax avoidance involving the Irish tax rulings occurred
before the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA), when the Code was more akin to a worldwide system of
taxation. Apple’s strategy was to avoid tax imposed under Subpart F of the Code, which it
successfully did utilizing the “check-the-box” regulations. See infra notes 82–95 and accompanying
text. However, even with the Code’s shift towards a more territorial system, the TCJA did not
materially alter either Subpart F or the check-the-box regulations, although the § 245A deduction
for the foreign portion of foreign corporation dividends reduced the importance of the check-thebox regulations as they pertain to the passive income portion of Subpart F, including items of income
used to compute § 954(a)(1) foreign personal holding company income. J. Clifton Fleming Jr.,
Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Expanded Worldwide Versus Territorial Taxation After the TCJA,
161 TAX NOTES 1173, 1179, 1181 (2018). As a result, the TCJA may not have completely undermined
the eﬃcacy of Apple’s tax avoidance strategy.
79 Darby & Lemaster, supra note 76, at 14.
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sales or exchanges of assets.80 In the context of cross-border organizational
structures and transactions, recognition events are typically dividend
distributions from a non-U.S. subsidiary to the U.S. parent or the sale of the
non-U.S. subsidiary.81
Subpart F82 of the Code, however, is an exception to this general tax
principle and attempts to tax currently U.S. parent corporations on speciﬁc
types of income earned by their foreign subsidiaries.83 Subpart F imposes tax
on “United States shareholder[s]” for income earned by “controlled foreign
corporation[s]” (CFCs).84 A foreign corporation is a CFC if U.S.
shareholders own more than ﬁfty percent of either the foreign corporation’s
voting power or the total value of its stock.85 A U.S. shareholder is deﬁned as
a “United States person” owning at least ten percent of the voting power or
share value of a foreign corporation.86 U.S. shareholders are subject to tax on
their pro rata share of a CFC’s “Subpart F income”87 which includes, among
other categories, “foreign base company sales income” and “foreign personal
holding company income,” both of which are subsets of § 952(a)(2) “foreign
base company income.”88 Foreign base company sales income includes income
derived from the sale of property sold to or initially purchased from a related
person or sold or purchased on behalf of a related person, where the property
was neither produced nor consumed in the CFC’s country of organization.89
Foreign personal holding company income primarily contemplates passive
income, such as dividends and interest income.90
At ﬁrst glance, it seems like Subpart F dictates that U.S.-based Apple Inc.
must pay taxes on the income earned by Apple Operations Europe and Apple
80 See I.R.C. § 61(a)(3) (including in gross income gains derived from property dealings); id.
§ 1001(a) (providing the method for computing the “gain from the sale or other disposition of property”
(emphasis added)); id. § 1001(c) (requiring the recognition of gain from the sale or exchange of property).
81 See Fleming Jr. et al., supra note 78, at 1174.
82 I.R.C. §§ 951-65.
83 Darby & Lemaster, supra note 76, at 2.
84 I.R.C. § 951(a)(1). For brevity’s sake, I use the term “U.S. shareholders” as a substitute for
“United States shareholder[s]” in this Section. See id.
85 Id. § 957(a).
86 Id. § 951(b). U.S. persons include U.S. based corporations. See id. (cross-referencing id.
§§ 957(c), 7701(a)(30)(C)). Ownership in the foreign corporation can be direct ownership, indirect
ownership, or constructive ownership as determined by applying the attribution rules provided in
§ 318(a) subject to some modiﬁcations. See id. §§ 951(b), 958(a)-(b); Treas. Reg. § 1.958-2(a), (c)-(d)
(as amended in 2020).
87 I.R.C. § 951(a)(1)(A); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.951-1(e) (as amended in 2019) (detailing the
computation of a U.S. shareholder’s pro rata share of subpart F income).
88 I.R.C. § 952(a)(2) (cross-referencing id. § 954(a)(1)-(2)).
89 Id. § 954(d)(1).
90 See id. § 954(c)(1) (including dividends, interest, royalties, rents, annuities, commodities
gains and losses, and foreign currency gains and losses, among other items, within the deﬁnition of
foreign personal holding company income).
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Sales International. Apple Sales International’s and Apple Operations
Europe’s sales appear to be foreign base company sales income, and any
distributions from Apple Sales International to Apple Operations Europe or
Apple Operations Europe to Apple Operations International appear to be
foreign personal holding company income.
Apple, however, avoided Subpart F and thus deferred U.S. tax on income
generated by its foreign subsidiaries by using other parts of the Code and
Treasury regulations. Apple primarily relied upon the “check-the-box”
regulations, which allow a parent company’s wholly owned foreign subsidiary
to be disregarded for tax purposes upon the subsidiary’s election to be treated
as such.91 Apple’s election under these regulations rendered all its foreign
subsidiaries, other than Apple Operations International, “disregarded
entities.” Apple Sales International, Apple Operations Europe, and other
foreign subsidiaries were all treated as part of Apple Operations International
for tax purposes, and those subsidiaries’ transactions were treated as Apple
Operations International’s transactions.92
As such, Apple had no foreign base company income. Although
distributions between these entities would ordinarily constitute foreign
personal holding company income under Subpart F, the distributions were
not attributable back to Apple Inc. because they were treated as occurring
exclusively within Apple Operations International and not between diﬀerent
corporate entities.
By treating all subsidiaries as part of Apple Operations International,
income from inter-subsidiary sales of Apple products was not foreign base
company sales income. Because the subsidiaries were disregarded, “it [was]
as if no intercompany sales happened at all.”93 To distribute physical product
to foreign markets, Apple Sales International purchased ﬁnished product
from a third-party manufacturer, then resold the product to oﬀshore
distribution subsidiaries. These distribution subsidiaries then sold the
product to end users.94 In form, the ﬁnal sales to customers should have
generated foreign base company sales income because they were “derived in
connection with the purchase of personal property from a related person;”
namely, the distribution subsidiaries’ purchases from Apple Sales
91 See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (as amended in 2019); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a), (b)(2) (as
amended in 2020) (allowing a wholly owned foreign subsidiary properly characterized as a “[f]oreign
eligible entity” to elect to be disregarded and treated as a division of its parent company); Levin &
McCain, supra note 57, at 35-36 (describing how Apple avoiding paying Subpart F income tax by
electing to disregard its wholly owned subsidiaries through the check-the-box regulations); see also
Darby & Lemaster, supra note 76, at 12.
92 See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (“[I]f the entity is disregarded, its activities are treated in the
same manner as a . . . division of the owner.”).
93 Levin & McCain, supra note 57, at 36.
94 Id. at 32 & ﬁg.
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International.95 However, because the check-the-box regulations rendered all
subsidiaries besides Apple Operations International disregarded, Apple
Operations International was eﬀectively treated as the sole entity that
purchased the product from a third-party manufacturer and made the sales to
end consumers.
Apple’s ability to circumvent Subpart F and thus defer U.S. tax elucidates
the attractiveness of Ireland’s tax rulings issued to Apple. Apple secured a
relatively low eﬀective Irish tax rate on its subsidiaries’ earnings while
structuring its operations to avoid tax on those subsidiaries’ Subpart F
income. The use of the Code and accompanying Treasury regulations to avoid
U.S. tax is not unique to Apple, nor is a tax ruling a necessary condition to
avoiding U.S. tax liability. However, tax rulings, because of their potential to
eﬀectively reduce MNE tax liability in the issuing country below what the
applicable tax laws seemingly mandate, can create more instances of and
render more attractive tax-motivated income shifting.
B. The OECD’s Earlier Work on Harmful Tax Practices
The OECD has long noticed the ability of MNEs to shift income to lowtax jurisdictions. It has also noticed the role of countries in encouraging this
income shifting. The OECD’s ﬁrst major attempt to address income shifting
and tax competition was its report entitled Harmful Tax Competition (1998
Report). The 1998 Report became the motivation and foundation of the
OECD BEPS Project and tax ruling transparency.

95 I.R.C. § 954(d)(1). Importantly, neither of the major exceptions to foreign base company
sales income provided implicitly by the Code and explicitly by the Treasury regulations under § 954
were applicable. Because the products sold were manufactured in China, the exceptions for property
manufactured in the CFC’s country of incorporation and for property manufactured by the CFC,
known as the manufacturing exceptions, were inapplicable. See id. § 954(d)(1)(A) (deﬁning foreign
base company sales income as income from sales of personal property “manufactured, produced,
grown, or extracted outside the country under the laws of which the [CFC] is created or organized”
(emphasis added)); Treas. Reg. § 1.954-3(a)(1)(i), (2), (4)(iii) (clarifying that the property sold must
be manufactured outside the CFC’s country of organization to yield foreign base company sales
income). Also, because the transactions were between Apple Sales International and the distribution
subsidiaries, the exception for property consumed within the selling company’s country of
incorporation was inapplicable. See I.R.C. § 954(d)(1)(B) (deﬁning foreign base company sales
income as income from sales of personal property “sold for use, consumption or disposition outside”
the CFC’s country of organization (emphasis added)); Treas. Reg. § 1.954-3(a)(3). Accordingly, the
use of the check-the-box regulations was crucial for Apple to avoid tax under Subpart F.
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1. The 1998 Report
The OECD began its work to combat income shifting by inﬂuencing
national tax policies in the 1980s.96 At that time, taxpayers began using
sophisticated international structures to exploit discrepancies among national
tax laws, which agitated countries and frustrated their fundamental task of
raising revenue.97 During this time, but before issuing the 1998 Report, the
OECD oﬀered some remedies to alleviate tax avoidance, such as model
transfer pricing guidelines and bilateral tax conventions.98 In 1994, the
OECD began approaching tax competition more directly, ultimately
producing the 1998 Report.99
The 1998 Report accomplishes two primary functions of “identifying
harmful tax regimes and labeling tax havens.”100 The 1998 Report begins with
the observation that countries use tax policies to attract ﬁnancial and other
mobile income from MNEs and individuals.101 The portion of the Report
dedicated to harmful preferential tax regimes aims to identify tax policy that
facilitates this sort of income diversion.102
The 1998 Report proﬀered several primary factors for the OECD and
countries to determine whether a tax regime is harmful and preferential.
First, a regime would need to apply a low or zero eﬀective tax rate on
geographically mobile income.103 Geographically mobile income is income
generated by activities “which can be most easily shifted in response to tax

96 See Morriss & Moberg, supra note 32, at 33 (noting that the OECD began inﬂuencing tax
policy in the 1980s to protect against tax competition that arose from taxpayers’ ability to shift
income geographically).
97 See id. at 33-39 (describing the evolution of “tax havens” in places like the Cayman Islands,
and the resulting revenue losses to national tax collectors, as well as the tax-planning competition
among large, developed economies).
98 See H. David Rosenbloom, Noam Noked & Mohamed S. Helal, The Unruly World of Tax: A
Proposal for an International Tax Cooperation Forum, 15 FLA. TAX REV. 57, 61-62 (2014) (noting the
introduction of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital and the 1995 Transfer
Pricing Guidelines).
99 See Morriss & Moberg, supra note 32, at 39-40, 42-43 (describing the failure of the OECD’s
ﬁrst eﬀort to combat tax competition, the “Project on Fiscal Degradation” (launched in 1994), and
the ultimate success of the 1998 Report).
100 Faulhaber, supra note 34, at 327.
101 OECD, 1998 REPORT, supra note 7, ¶ 23.
102 See id. ¶ 57 (“Many OECD Member and non-member countries have already established
or are considering establishing preferential tax regimes to attract highly mobile ﬁnancial and other
service activities. . . . This section discusses factors that may help identify harmful preferential tax
regimes, without targeting speciﬁc countries.”).
103 Id. at 25-27; see also Faulhaber, supra note 34, at 329 (noting that the OECD considered tax regimes
harmful when they “offered rates that were lower than the overall corporate rate in the jurisdiction”).
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diﬀerentials,” such as ﬁnancial and other service activities.104 To qualify as
harmful and preferential, a regime would then need to either (1) be “ringfenced,” or one in which domestic taxpayers typically could not beneﬁt from
the regime; (2) operate with little transparency; or (3) not be subject to
information sharing with other countries regarding the regime.105
The 1998 Report concludes with recommended measures to combat
harmful preferential regimes. It instructed OECD member countries to
review their preferential regimes to determine whether they are harmful, and
if found to be harmful, abolish the regimes or the regimes’ harmful aspects.106
The Report also authorized countries to enact or strengthen defensive
measures against harmful preferential regimes existing elsewhere, such as
implementing or strengthening CFC rules107 similar to the U.S. Code’s
Subpart F described above.108 In addition to the prescribed defensive
measures, the OECD also created the Forum on Harmful Tax Practices
(FHTP) to assist member countries in assessing and reviewing their
preferential regimes.109
C. The OECD BEPS Project and Tax Ruling Transparency
The OECD’s work on harmful tax practices and income shifting did not
end with the 1998 Report. In 2012, G-20 countries requested that the OECD
develop a plan to address BEPS by MNEs.110 The OECD subsequently
produced an action plan, which highlighted the impact of BEPS on countries’
tax bases and proffered broad measures to tackle BEPS.111 This action plan
ultimately culminated in the introduction of the OECD BEPS Project in 2015.112

104 OECD, 1998 REPORT, supra note 7, ¶¶ 57-58. Importantly, the 1998 Report explicitly
excludes from its scope the use of tax incentives to attract investments in plants, building, and
equipment. Id. ¶ 6.
105 Id. at 27; see also Faulhaber, supra note 34, at 329. The Report provided other factors that
can help with the determination as to whether a country’s tax regime is harmful and preferential,
including the economic eﬀects of the regime. OECD, 1998 REPORT, supra note 7, ¶¶ 68-84; see also
Faulhaber, supra note 34, at 328 n.88.
106 OECD, 1998 REPORT, supra note 7, at 56-57; see also Morriss & Moberg, supra note 32, at 45.
107 OCED, 1998 REPORT, supra note 7, ¶¶ 86-87 (recommending unilateral defensive measures
in addition to multilateral responses); see also id. ¶¶ 97-137 (providing examples of unilateral,
bilateral, and multilateral defensive measures to combat harmful preferential tax regimes).
108 See supra notes 82–90 and accompanying text.
109 OECD, 1998 REPORT, supra note 7, annex I at 65-66; see also Faulhaber, supra note 34, at 328.
110 OECD, BEPS ACTION PLAN, supra note 54, at 11.
111 See id. at 7-26 (providing background on the problems posed by BEPS and laying out ﬁfteen
action items to counter BEPS).
112 OECD, BACKGROUND BRIEF: INCLUSIVE FRAMEWORK ON BEPS 7 (2017).
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1. The OECD BEPS Project’s Actions
The OECD BEPS Project is founded on three pillars: “coherence,
substance, and transparency.”113 To this end, the “BEPS Package” consists of
“soft law” tools,114 consistent with the foundational pillars, to help countries
combat tax avoidance by MNEs.115 The aim of these tools is to ensure that
proﬁts are taxed “where economic activities generating the proﬁts are
performed and where value is created.”116 Essentially, the BEPS Package
attempts to align the location of taxation and economic activity to stem
artiﬁcial income shifting that serves no economic purpose. The OECD BEPS
Project’s emphasis on coherence and transparency in international tax matters
aid in this alignment.
To eﬀectuate these goals, the OECD BEPS Project recommends ﬁfteen
“Actions.”117 Generally, these Actions can be divided between “minimum
standards” and other broad implementations, such as best practices.118 The
minimum standards are policies that “[c]ountries and jurisdictions of
relevance” must implement to achieve a “level playing ﬁeld.”119 The broader
implementations strive to reinforce desirable international tax standards and
provide for best practices that participating countries should follow.120
The Actions, which correspond to the aforementioned pillars, address
more speciﬁc phenomena that facilitate tax avoidance. Action 1 deals with tax
challenges unique to the current digital economy.121 Actions 2, 3, and 4
attempt to instill coherence in international standards on matters such as
CFC rules and interest deductibility.122 Actions 5 (in part)123 and 6 through
10 help to ensure that substance governs taxation, rather than purely taxmotivated structures.124 Actions 5 (in part)125 and 11 through 14 aim to
enhance transparency in areas such as transfer pricing documentation and tax

Biz, supra note 20, at 1055.
OECD, OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT: 2015 FINAL
REPORTS FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 5 (2015); see also Christians, supra note 20, at 1644-45
(describing the features of the BEPS Package as “common forms of soft law governance”).
115 What Is BEPS?, supra note 14.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 See OECD, 2018–2019 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 18, at 16, 21 (contrasting the
“minimum standard” of Action 14 with the “best practice[]” recommendations of Actions 2, 3, and 4).
119 What Is BEPS?, supra note 14.
120 See OECD, 2018–2019 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 18, at 2.
121 Biz, supra note 20, at 1055.
122 OECD, 2018–2019 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 18, at 21.
123 The portion of Action 5 that concerns substance is the work on preferential tax regimes. Id. at 2-3.
124 OECD, 2019–2020 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 18, at 1, 18-20.
125 The portion of Action 5 that concerns transparency is the exchange of information on tax
rulings. OECD, 2018–2019 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 18, at 3.
113
114
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ruling practices.126 Finally, Action 15 addresses the need to quickly implement
the OECD BEPS Project’s Actions.127
2. Action 5’s Transparency Framework
Action 5 of the OECD BEPS Project, in part, mandates tax ruling
transparency.128 More speciﬁcally, Action 5 calls for the “compulsory
spontaneous exchange of information in respect of [tax] rulings,”129 which
historically were conﬁdential and not shared with other jurisdictions.130 The
transparency framework applies to only some rulings. First, Action 5 covers
only taxpayer-speciﬁc rulings as opposed to general rulings.131 General rulings
are only contemplated by the transparency framework’s “best practices.”132
Second, the rulings must be such that the absence of transparency would give
rise to “BEPS concerns.”133 Action 5 explicitly contemplates the following
rulings as potentially giving rise to BEPS concerns: (1) rulings pertaining to
preferential regimes, (2) unilateral APAs or other cross-border rulings
pertaining to transfer pricing, (3) cross-border rulings providing a downward
adjustment to taxable proﬁts, (4) permanent establishment (PE)134 rulings,
Id. at 9, 14, annex B at 31-32.
Biz, supra note 20, at 1055.
The remainder of Action 5 concerns preferential regimes, a continuation of the OECD’s earlier
work on the 1998 Report. See OECD, ACTION 5 – 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, ¶¶ 1-2, 23.
129 Id. ¶¶ 91-94; see also OECD, TRANSFER PRICING DOCUMENTATION AND COUNTRY-BYCOUNTRY REPORTING: ACTION 13 – 2015 FINAL REPORT ¶ 1; id. annex I to ch. V at 26; id. annex
II to ch. V, at 28 (2015) [hereinafter OECD, ACTION 13 – 2015 FINAL REPORT] (requiring MNEs
to document and share certain transfer pricing information, including tax rulings and APAs).
130 Stuart Gibson, EU State Aid; More Cracks in the Wall of Secrecy, 80 TAX NOTES INT’L 473,
473 (2015) (describing tax ruling practices in countries such as the Netherlands and U.S. and noting
that these countries keep rulings “secret” and do not exchange them with other countries).
131 OECD, ACTION 5 – 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, ¶ 102; see also Mindy Herzfeld,
News Analysis, The End of Private Tax Rulings, 80 TAX NOTES INT’L 131, 132 (2015) (listing the six
categories of taxpayer-speciﬁc rulings).
132 OECD, ACTION 5 – 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, ¶ 102.
133 Id. ¶ 91; see also Faulhaber, supra note 34, at 338 (“[R]ulings that could ‘give[] rise to BEPS
concerns,’ . . . include ﬁve enumerated categories of rulings and can only include other types of
rulings if all countries in the FHTP agree.” (quoting OECD, ACTION 5 – 2015 FINAL REPORT,
supra note 17, ¶ 120)).
134 When an enterprise conducts business operations in a foreign country, the enterprise is
generally subject to that country’s tax laws. However, if the enterprise’s residence country and the
foreign country have a tax treaty, that treaty will, as is typical, provide for a minimum level of
activity an enterprise must conduct to be subject to tax by the foreign country. This minimum level
of activity is PE. What Is a Permanent Establishment?, BAKER TILLY US, LLP (Jan. 7, 2019),
https://www.bakertilly.com/insights/what-is-a-permanent-establishment [https://perma.cc/VDR4GYW4]; see also OECD, PREVENTING THE ARTIFICIAL AVOIDANCE OF PERMANENT
ESTABLISHMENT STATUS: ACTION 7 – 2015 FINAL REPORT 9 (2015) [hereinafter OECD, ACTION
7 – 2015 FINAL REPORT] (“[T]he business proﬁts of a foreign enterprise are taxable in a State only
to the extent that the enterprise has in that State a permanent establishment (PE) to which the
126
127
128
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(5) related party conduit rulings, and (6) any other type of ruling that the
FHTP agrees would give rise to BEPS concerns in the absence of a
spontaneous exchange of information.135 Third, the rulings must be either
“future” or “past” rulings.136 Future rulings include those issued on or after
April 1, 2016.137 Past rulings are those issued after January 1, 2010 and still in
eﬀect as of January 1, 2014.138
Action 5 also indicates with whom the issuing country must exchange
applicable rulings. In general, the issuing country “must automatically
exchange” the ruling with countries that the ruling may aﬀect,139 which
includes the countries of residence of the immediate and ultimate parent
companies of the taxpayer and the countries of residence of all related
parties140 incident to the ruling.141 PE rulings also require an exchange with
the residence country of the head oﬃce or the country of the PE, as the case
may be, while related party conduit rulings require an additional exchange
with the country of residence of the “ultimate beneﬁcial owner . . . of
payments made to the conduit.”142
The OECD also prescribed practical implementation measures and best
practices for the automatic exchange of information pertaining to tax rulings.
For example, issuing countries should exchange future rulings as soon as
possible but no later than three months after issuing the ruling, and recipient
countries should ensure that taxpayer information contained in the ruling
remains confidential.143 The best practices contemplate the process of granting

proﬁts are attributable.”). As such, a PE ruling can eﬀectively determine whether an enterprise is
subject to tax in a foreign country in which it operates.
The requisite level of activity can differ across treaties. The U.S.-Ireland tax treaty, for example,
defines PE as “a fixed place of business through which the business of an enterprise is wholly or partly
carried on” yet excludes, for example, storage facilities. Tax Convention, supra note 77, art. 5(1).
135 OECD, ACTION 5 – 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, ¶ 91; see also Christians, supra note
20, at 1632 (discussing the ways in which the OECD is developing the exchange of administrative
rulings); Achim Pross, Kevin Shoom & Melissa Dejong, Harmful Tax Incentives Critically Curtailed:
BEPS Action 5 in Action, INT’L TAX. REV., Nov. 2017, at 14, 14 (discussing the work on preferential
tax regimes under BEPS Action 5).
136 OECD, ACTION 5 – 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, ¶ 126 (emphasis omitted). There
is no obligation to exchange past rulings if on or after September 1, 2017 the country either joined
the Inclusive Framework or was identiﬁed as a “jurisdiction of relevance.” OECD, BEPS ACTION
5 ON HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES – TRANSPARENCY FRAMEWORK 10 (2021).
137 OECD, ACTION 5 – 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, ¶ 129.
138 Id. ¶ 126; see also Mindy Herzfeld, News Analysis, Looking Forward to 2016, 80 TAX NOTES
INT’L 985, 986 (2015).
139 Faulhaber, supra note 34, at 333.
140 Two parties are related if one has at least a 25% investment in the other or a third party has at
least a 25% investment in the two parties. OECD, ACTION 5 – 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, ¶ 122.
141 See id. ¶ 121.
142 Id. ¶ 124.
143 Id. ¶¶ 133-40.
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a ruling, the time period of the ruling’s effect, and the publication of rulings.144
Moreover, the exchanged information should include a summary of the
transaction at issue as well as an indication of the recipient entity’s profit.145
Since the promulgation of Action 5’s transparency framework,
participating countries have actively exchanged tax rulings. The OECD
reviews participating countries’ exchange practices annually146 and issues
Progress Reports detailing the amount of exchange and the level of
compliance.147 As of July 2020, countries participating in the OECD BEPS
Project exchanged approximately 18,000 rulings.148 Currently, OECD review
indicates that 80 out of 112 jurisdictions did not receive any recommendations
regarding their exchange practices pursuant to Action 5.149 However, during
review, the OECD made 55 recommendations to 32 jurisdictions, indicating
that some jurisdictions are not fully complying with Action 5’s framework.150
But what happens when a country fails to comply with Action 5’s exchange
requirement? And of greater concern: what happens when a country issues a
ruling, but the ruling’s subject matter deviates from a normal application of the
country’s tax laws, regardless of whether the country exchanges the ruling or
not? And what happens when this ruling deviates from an OECD BEPS Project
Action or other OECD guidance? This Comment addresses what enforcement
measures the OECD BEPS Project contemplates for these violative tax rulings.
The OECD BEPS Project does not contemplate direct repercussions for
violative tax rulings. In 2018, the OECD recommended that countries impose
penalties on MNEs that fail to satisfy the substantial activities requirement
with respect to preferential regimes addressed in Action 5. But it does not
seem that any countries have instituted this recommendation, and the
suggestion is fundamentally flawed because it places the responsibility of
penalizing MNEs on the country instituting the harmful preferential regime
in the first place, seemingly ignoring that these regimes are designed to induce
artificial income shifting.151 Additionally, there are no direct penalties imposed
Id. ¶ 141.
Id. annex C at 78-79.
See Grinberg, supra note 20, at 1165.
Action 5: Harmful Tax Practices, OECD, https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/bepsactions/action5/#:~:text=The%20Forum%20on%20Harmful%20Tax,tax%20base%20of%20other%20j
urisdictions [https://perma.cc/3MJ9-N92D] (stating that the FHTP will conduct the peer review
and monitoring process with respect to Action 5’s transparency framework).
148 OECD, 2019–2020 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 18, at 16.
149 Id.
150 See id.
151 In 2018, the OECD issued a report (2018 Report) concerning the substantial activities
requirement of Action 5’s guidance with respect to harmful preferential regimes. OECD,
RESUMPTION OF APPLICATION OF SUBSTANTIAL ACTIVITIES FACTOR TO NO OR ONLY
NOMINAL TAX JURISDICTIONS ¶¶ 21-23 (2018). To ensure compliance with the substantial
activities requirement, the OECD recommends that a jurisdiction that has the preferential regime
144
145
146
147
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on an issuing country if the ruling’s subject matter violates an OECD BEPS
Project Action, other OECD guidance, or a normal application of the issuing
country’s tax laws.152 Only limited defensive measures,153 designed to mitigate
the adverse tax consequences of the ruling to the MNE’s residence country,
are available when a violative ruling adversely impacts another country.154 For
example, if a ruling pertains to a preferential regime later found to be harmful
under Action 5 and the issuing country fails to abolish the harmful preferential
regime, affected countries may only take authorized defensive measures to
counteract the effects of that regime.155 The affected country could not, for

enact a “sanction mechanism” to ensure compliance. Id. ¶ 42; see also Jeﬀerey Kadet, BEPS Primer:
Past, Present, Future, 168 TAX NOTES FED. 45, 54 (2020) (“[T]o ensure compliance, companies
subject to these rules would have to report on their activities and be subject to sanctions for
noncompliance.”). While this recommendation does not apply to the tax ruling transparency portion
of Action 5 directly, because rulings relating to preferential regimes are subject to exchange the
recommendation still needs to be addressed. First, there is no mention in either of the BEPS Project
Progress Reports after the 2018 Report of any jurisdiction that has implemented this type of sanction
mechanism. See OECD, 2019–2020 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 18, at 14-17; OECD, 2018–2019
PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 18, at 9-10. Moreover, the sanction mechanism recommendation is
theoretically ﬂawed. Countries implement preferential regimes to induce income shifting to those
countries. By sanctioning ﬁrms for utilizing preferential regimes without complying with the
substantial activities requirement, countries would eﬀectively and simultaneously encourage and
discourage preferential regime induced income shifting. As such, there is no incentive for countries
to sanction such ﬁrms because these countries want to induce income shifting. See infra Section II.A.
Additionally, the determination of whether an MNE complied with the substantial activities
requirement would have to stem from review of that MNEs annual country-by-country reporting
under Action 13. However, this information is conﬁdential. OECD, ACTION 13 – 2015 FINAL
REPORT, supra note 129, annex IV to ch. V at 43 ¶ 2. Because this information is conﬁdential, there
is not an eﬀective way for parties other than the country and MNE at issue to know whether that
MNE failed to satisfy the substantial activities requirement. Accordingly, the 2018 Report’s
recommendation does not warrant any consideration when determining whether the OECD
contemplates penalties or sanctions with respect to tax rulings.
152 A violation of the relevant country’s tax laws would most likely constitute a ruling that would
give rise to BEPS concerns to the extent that the violation induced artificial income shifting, which
would subject the ruling to Action 5’s exchange. See supra notes 133–35 and accompanying text.
153 OECD, ACTION 5 – 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, ¶ 22 (authorizing the use of
defensive measures listed in the 1998 Report); see also CÉCILE REMEUR, UNDERSTANDING BEPS:
FROM TAX AVOIDANCE TO DIGITAL TAX CHALLENGES, EUR. PARLIAMENTARY RSCH. SERV.,
PE 642.258 4 (2019) (noting that some BEPS Actions contemplate defensive measures).
Implementing or strengthening CFC rules, such as the Code’s Subpart F, is an example of an
allowable defensive measure. OECD, 1998 REPORT, supra note 7, at 40-42.
154 Action 5’s discussion on defensive measures only appears in the portion concerning harmful
preferential regimes. See OECD, ACTION 5 – 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, ¶ 22. However,
countries routinely implement these authorized measures by means of their sovereign taxing power
to combat tax avoidance caused by income shifting, regardless of whether ﬁrms avoid tax by utilizing
harmful preferential regimes. Accordingly, whether or not Action 5 explicitly authorizes the use of
these measures to combat tax ruling induced income shifting is irrelevant, and this Comment will
assume these measures are available to combat such income shifting.
155 See OECD, ACTION 5 – 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, ¶ 22 (authorizing countries to
use defensive measures when another country fails to abolish a harmful preferential regime).
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example, impose sanctions on the issuing country. However, as even the
OECD admits, the prescribed defensive measures’ efficacy is questionable.156
Notably, Action 5 does not discuss any direct measures to deter MNEs
from utilizing violative rulings. There is no mechanism to force MNEs to
disgorge unwarranted tax concessions, nor are there penalties for capitalizing
on violative tax rulings. Moreover, the authorized defensive measures are
inadequate to prevent MNEs from utilizing these rulings. However, in other
areas of law, the OECD observes that some form of deterrence is necessary
for compliance. For example, in the context of competition law, the OECD
readily admits that penalties or sanctions are necessary to deter violations. A
report published by the OECD notes that “[f]ines play a role in deterrence
by making unlawful conduct less proﬁtable. Breaking competition laws is
proﬁtable if it goes undetected. From the perspective of a pure proﬁtmaximising company, it will not violate the law if the expected monetary
sanctions are greater than the expected illegal gain.”157 The fundamental
parallels between tax avoidance and violating antitrust laws suggest that a
ﬁrm would deploy a similar proﬁt maximizing analysis when considering tax
avoidance. If anything, tax avoidance is an easier application of this analysis
because tax avoidance is legal, making it prima facie more socially acceptable
than violating antitrust law, notwithstanding any criminal sanctions
associated with the latter. So, as the OECD BEPS Project does not
contemplate measures that can adequately frustrate the net beneﬁts of tax
avoidance, there is only upside from utilizing favorable tax rulings, which
raises suspicion as to the optimism pertaining to the anticipated behavioral
responses of the transparency framework.
II. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF ACTION 5 AND THE COMPLEMENTARITY
OF TRANSPARENCY AND DISGORGEMENT
Action 5’s transparency framework alone is unlikely to produce the
behavioral changes contemplated and desired by the OECD. This Part
provides a formal, yet approachable, economic analysis to illustrate the
theoretical behavioral changes resulting from transparency. It shows that
transparency alone will not create even modest behavioral changes by either

156 E.g., OECD, 1998 REPORT, supra note 7, ¶¶ 89, 91 (noting that “in the absence of
international cooperation [in implementing defensive measures] there is little incentive for a country
which provides a harmful preferential tax regime to eliminate it” because MNEs can easily shift their
income to other jurisdictions and positing that while “unilateral measures are easiest for countries to
adopt . . . . multilateral responses . . . which are the most difficult to adopt . . . . are essential”).
157 SEMIN
PARK, OECD, SANCTIONS IN ANTITRUST CASES 5 (2016),
https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/GF(2016)6/en/pdf [https://perma.cc/QXR3-P47V].
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MNEs or countries, but would create signiﬁcant behavioral changes when
accompanied by a disgorgement mechanism.
A. Expected Behavioral Responses Following Action 5’s Transparency Framework
It is ﬁrst important to note that taxes aﬀect ﬁrm decisionmaking. Like any
other input cost, taxes create negative pressure on, or reduce, proﬁt. As such,
imposing taxes can aﬀect real economic activity, such as location and
investment decisions.158 The free ﬂow of capital, goods, and services across
international borders has increased MNE sensitivity, or responsiveness, to
potential taxes, as MNEs can more easily alter their organizational structure
to optimize tax costs.159 However, in some instances tax costs do not aﬀect
real economic activity, such as output or supply chain decisions, but still
motivate ﬁrms to artiﬁcially shift their income. Although Action 5’s
transparency framework is broad—as it seemingly applies to rulings involving
all types of income rather than solely geographically mobile income
contemplated in the 1998 Report and Action 5’s portion dedicated to
preferential regimes—tax rulings typically facilitate this artiﬁcial income
shifting.160
Action 5’s transparency framework alone cannot adequately combat the
use of tax rulings to facilitate artiﬁcial income shifting. A country will issue
a favorable ruling when the beneﬁts of doing so exceed the costs. An MNE
will artiﬁcially shift income to the issuing country when the ruling renders
income shifting the proﬁt-maximizing alternative. Action 5 will not prevent
the practice of using favorable rulings to induce income shifting because
neither transparency nor the authorized defensive measures will aﬀect the
ruling’s net beneﬁts to the issuing country or the utility to the MNE.
1. In the Absence of Transparency
Acknowledging that tax costs aﬀect ﬁrm behavior improves the analysis
of tax rulings and income shifting. This subsection will ﬁrst model ﬁrm and
country behavior before the introduction of Action 5 and its transparency

158 OECD, ADDRESSING BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING 28 (2013) (“[T]ax aﬀects
decisions on where and how to invest.”).
159 Id. at 25.
160 Giraud & Petit, supra note 29, at 234 (noting that MNEs have been using transfer pricing to
reduce tax liability for decades and that MNEs are “increasingly agile at locating their revenues and profits
in the jurisdiction of their choosing”); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Haiyan Xu, Global Taxation After the Crisis:
Why BEPS and MAATM are Inadequate Responses, and What Can Be Done About It 22 (U. Mich. Pub. L. &
Legal Theory Rsch. Paper No. 494, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2716124
(“[A] lack of transparency in connection with certain [tax] rulings ha[s] been widely used by MNEs for
artificial profit shifting.” (emphasis added)).
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framework. In this model, let F be an MNE with country k source income,
which was not artiﬁcially shifted to country k but is able to be artiﬁcially
shifted. F must decide whether and where to artiﬁcially shift this income
among a set of countries, S. F’s generalized after-tax proﬁt function is
Π(q, t) = R(q) – C(q, t),161
where proﬁt, Π, is a function of the quantity, q, of goods or services sold or
other income producing property either sold or otherwise generating income
for F162 and of taxes, t, that F must pay. R(q) and C(q, t) are F’s revenue and
cost functions, respectively. Moreover, for every increase in the F’s tax cost,
F’s costs will increase, which is characterizable using the ﬁrst order partial
derivative of the cost function with respect to t:
!"($,&)
!&

> 0 ∀t ∈ ℝ.

Thus, an increase in F’s tax cost will decrease F’s proﬁt, as
!(($,&)
!&

=-

!"($,&)
!&

< 0 ∀t ∈ ℝ.

161 The proﬁt function represents the present value of F’s proﬁt across n periods where n ∈ [1,
2, 3, . . .] and represents the number of periods F will evaluate if it receives a ruling. This is the
appropriate consideration because MNEs that shift income generally ought to consider the total
value of a tax concession across all relevant periods and rulings can aﬀord tax concessions across
multiple time periods. For example, the rulings Ireland issued to Apple provided tax beneﬁts to
Apple across multiple years.
162 For example, interest earned by F is income producing property that is not sold but still
produces income for F.
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Because F seeks to maximize its after-tax proﬁt, it will “leave” its income
in country k because it is assumed that F’s proﬁt from leaving such income in
country k yields a higher proﬁt for F than if it shifted its income to any other
country in S,163 or
Πk(qk, tk) > Πi(qi, ti) ∀i ∈ S/{k}.164

Suppose country j wants F to shift the income there rather than leave it
in country k. Because F is artiﬁcially shifting income, there is no need for F
to restructure its operations to shift this income, which otherwise would
impose income shifting costs on F. So, there are no shifting costs that country
j would need to oﬀset to induce the income shifting. Also, because F is
artiﬁcially shifting income, any incentives designed to aﬀect real economic
activity, such as manufacturing subsidies or other related state-provided
assistance, will be ineﬀective to induce F to shift its income to country j. As
such, a tax cost reduction larger than the diﬀerence in F’s proﬁt generated by
leaving the income in country k rather than shifting it to country j is likely
the only way to induce F to shift its income to country j. To decrease F’s tax
liability such that country j becomes the proﬁt maximizing location, country
j will issue a tax ruling.
In general, tax rulings are preferable to enacting favorable domestic tax law
for three reasons. First, legislative changes occur slowly.165 Second, tax rulings

163 Absent a tax ruling, country k can be the proﬁt maximizing location for several reasons. For
example, country k may impose the lowest eﬀective tax rate on the type of income at issue.
Additionally, because F’s proﬁt maximizing quantity is country speciﬁc, income shifting may lead to
a lower proﬁt even if there exists some other country that would impose a lower eﬀective tax rate
on the income absent a ruling.
164 The proﬁt functions here include subscripts to denote F’s proﬁt from shifting its income to
a speciﬁc country. The proﬁt maximizing quantity and tax cost also include such subscripts. While
denoting the tax cost by each country is necessary because countries impose diﬀerent tax costs, the
proﬁt maximizing quantity may not be country speciﬁc because this model analyzes the income
shifting due to favorable tax rulings, which generally involves artiﬁcial proﬁt shifting. Generally,
artiﬁcial income shifting for tax avoidance purposes is unlikely to generate real economic eﬀects,
such as eﬀects on the proﬁt maximizing quantity, because tax-motivated income shifting does not
typically require operational adjustments. See What Is BEPS?, supra note 14 (“BEPS refers to tax
planning strategies . . . to artificially shift proﬁts to low or no-tax locations where there is little or no
economic activity . . . .” (emphasis added)). However, because there could conceivably be diﬀerent
proﬁt maximizing quantities depending on where a ﬁrm shifts its income, this comment will
continue to denote the proﬁt maximizing quantity by the location of such income.
165 See, e.g., Writing and Enacting Tax Legislation, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/faqs/taxes/pages/writing.aspx [https://perma.cc/E2FZKCC4] (last updated Dec. 5, 2010, 10:28 AM). Political inﬁghting within legislative bodies and the
need to address other policy matters can also frustrate tax law changes. See, e.g., Rocky Mengle,
President Biden’s Tax Plans for the Next Few Years, KIPLINGER (Feb. 3, 2021)
https://www.kiplinger.com/taxes/602109/president-bidens-tax-plans-for-the-next-few-years
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can be targeted at a specific taxpayer while tax law changes are broadly applicable.
Even if a ruling is a general ruling, it can still be targeted toward a specific type
of transaction, and depending on the frequency of that transaction type, the
general ruling could have the same effect as a taxpayer-specific ruling.166 Third,
tax rulings are more discrete than a tax law change,167 which can mitigate any
political backlash from providing a tax concession to a foreign MNE.
In the model, a tax ruling that aims to reduce F’s tax cost must place enough
downward pressure on F’s tax cost to render country j a more attractive income
location than country k. More specifically, the tax concession afforded by the
ruling, denoted ∆tj, must reduce F’s tax cost to increase F’s profit by an amount
greater than the difference between F’s profit in country k and F’s pre-ruling
profit in country j. The necessary increase can be expressed as the inequality
!(($),&))
!&

× ∆tj > Πk(qk, tk) − Πj(qj, tj),

where the left side of the inequality is the linearly approximated168 change in
F’s proﬁt following the ruling and the right side is the diﬀerence between F’s
proﬁt in country k and F’s pre-ruling proﬁt in country j. The inequality can
be simpliﬁed when considering that the ﬁrst order partial derivative of F’s
proﬁt evaluated at any point will be -1, following some simplifying
assumptions.169 That is, a one dollar increase in tax results in a one dollar
decrease in after-tax proﬁt. So,
[https://perma.cc/5Q8R-367W] (suggesting that Republican inﬂuence and prioritization of the
COVID-19 pandemic could delay President Biden’s tax policy agenda).
166 See, e.g., Understanding IRS Guidance, supra note 43 (deﬁning a Revenue Ruling, which is a
general ruling, as a “conclusion of the IRS on how the law is applied to a speciﬁc set of facts” without
imposing any constraint on the speciﬁcity of either the transaction type or factual background, which
suggests that general rulings can oﬀer guidance on an extremely narrow set of facts).
167 Compare Other IRS Guidance, GEO. L. LIBR., https://guides.ll.georgetown.edu/
c.php?g=271147&p=2724631 [https://perma.cc/NV43-GJYD] (last updated Mar. 11, 2021, 2:50 PM) (explaining
that private letter rulings are not published in a reporter and identifying information is redacted), with How
Our Laws Are Made, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/help/learn-about-the-legislativeprocess/how-our-laws-are-made [https://perma.cc/PYS5-7KQ6] (describing the U.S. legislative process and
noting the public access to the process and final legislation, including public hearings, broadcast of live
coverage of floor proceedings, and publication of the final legislation).
168 A linear approximation is the approximated change of a function due to a change in one of
its variables. The approximated change of a function is measured by multiplying the ﬁrst order
partial derivative of a function with respect to one of its variables (here,
change in that variable (here, ∆tj).
169

For

!"($%,'%)
!'

!"($%,'%)
!'

) by the actual

× ∆tj = |∆tj|, F must not otherwise use the tax savings aﬀorded by the ruling

to generate additional income. For example, F could earn interest on the tax cost savings aﬀorded
by the ruling. Because F theoretically could generate additional income from the tax savings, the
model began with the linear approximation to express F’s change in proﬁt from the tax concession.
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× ∆tj

can be expressed as the absolute value170 of the change in F’s tax cost following
the ruling, which simpliﬁes the inequality to
|∆tj| > Πk(qk, tk) − Πj(qj, tj).171

Therefore, when the tax concession satisﬁes the inequality, F will shift its
income to country j instead of leaving it in country k.172
Country j would offer such a concession when the benefits of F shifting its
income to country j exceed any costs to country j resulting from the ruling, or
uj > cj,
where uj and cj denote the benefits to and costs incurred by country j, respectively.
These costs and beneﬁts must be identiﬁed by evaluating actual countries’
experiences from facilitating tax avoidance. Countries primarily incur
political costs by acting as tax avoidance centers, though the countries’
residents may also suﬀer welfare costs.173 Although countries generally do not
To make the inequality and subsequent analysis simpler, it is assumed that F cannot otherwise use
the tax savings to generate income in addition to the income resulting from a reduced tax cost.
170 The tax concession must be expressed as the absolute value because the change in F’s tax
cost is a negative number.
171 For the remainder of this Comment Πk(qk, tk) and Πj(qj, tj) will be expressed as Πk and Πj,
respectively.
172 Two points are worth addressing. First, it is possible that country j’s tax ruling would
produce feedback eﬀects, possibly inducing country k to issue its own tax ruling to F. It is also
possible that country j could intend to issue its ruling following an intention by country k to do so.
To generalize the model’s conclusions, tk in Πk(qk, tk) shall be interpreted as country k’s “best oﬀer,”
which may include a favorable ruling issued by country k.
Second, some may question the sequence of events involved; that is, country j will issue its ruling
before F decides whether to shift its income there. It is natural to think that F would first have to actually
shift its income before either country could or would issue a tax ruling affording favorable tax treatment
to F. However, income shifting accompanied by tax rulings typically occur in the manner implicit in
the model, that is, the MNE first secures a favorable ruling with a tax jurisdiction and then subsequently
structures itself to utilize the ruling. See, e.g., Dina Gusovsky, Taxes, Multinational Firms & Luxembourg
– Revealed, CNBC (Nov. 7, 2014, 8:57 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2014/11/06/taxes-multinationalfirms-luxembourgrevealed.html [https://perma.cc/AXT8-XLDN] (noting that, in Luxembourg,
companies often first consult with the tax authority to get a tax ruling approved which then gives them
“the green light” for structuring their operations to benefit from the ruling); see also id. (noting that
many tax rulings are preapproved, which is “the equivalent of a foreign firm coming to the United
States and arranging its tax burden with the IRS in advance”).
173 See, e.g., Brooke Harrington, Why Tax Havens are Political and Economic Disasters, ATLANTIC
(July 28, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/07/tax-haven-curse/491411
[https://perma.cc/RZ38-ASML] (ﬁnding that acting as a conduit for tax avoidance may depress
resident income through an increased cost of living). These welfare costs are externalities, as they
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want to be perceived as tax avoidance centers174 because that perception
adversely impacts their international reputation, the actual costs incurred
from this reputational harm are generally negligible.175 Even widely
publicized accounts of countries aiding tax avoidance often do not induce
signiﬁcant directed responses from aﬀected jurisdictions.176 The beneﬁts,
however, of becoming tax avoidance centers primarily include increased tax
revenues,177 as well as possible increases in employment178 and economic
growth.179 Overall, however, countries generally receive diﬀerent beneﬁts
when they induce artiﬁcial income shifting in comparison to obtaining
ordinary foreign direct investment (FDI).180
are not borne directly by the tax authority issuing the ruling or the MNE receiving the ruling.
Therefore, it is possible that the taxing authority would not even consider such costs when deciding
to issue the ruling.
174 See, e.g., Will Goodbody, The Apple Tax Case Appeal: All You Need to Know, RTÉ (Sept. 15,
2019, 7:44 PM), https://www.rte.ie/news/analysis-and-comment/2019/0915/1075817-apple-taxappeal-explained [https://perma.cc/JX2C-5APB](noting the Irish government’s “strong[]” denial of
claims that Ireland is a tax haven); Gusovsky, supra note 172 (“A spokesman for Luxembourg’s
Minister of Finance . . . strongly rejects the assertion that Luxembourg is a tax haven and said that
his country fully complies with European and international law in tax matters.”). It is important to
note that this Section focuses on the costs and beneﬁts to countries in the absence of tax ruling
transparency. Possible modiﬁcations to these variables following tax ruling transparency will be
discussed in infra subsection II.A.2.
175 See, e.g., Cayman Islands Added to the EU List of Non-Cooperative Jurisdictions: Practical Impact
for Cayman Island Funds and Their Managers, DECHERT LLP (Feb. 19, 2020),
https://www.dechert.com/content/dechert/en/knowledge/onpoint/2020/2/cayman-islands-added-tothe-eu-list-of-non-cooperative-jurisdict.html [https://perma.cc/YH44-NW8T] (noting that the
Cayman Islands’ addition to the E.U. blacklist due to the former’s tax practices “is not expected to
impact Cayman Islands funds ability to raise capital from global investors”).
176 See, e.g., Simon Bowers, Why Has the European Commission Not Investigated LuxLeaks Tax Deals?, INT’L
CONSORTIUM OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (Feb. 12, 2019), https://www.icij.org/investigations/
luxembourg-leaks/why-has-the-european-commission-not-investigated-lux-leaks-tax-deals [https://perma.cc/
2TQ8-M4LB] (noting the European Commission’s laggard response following the LuxLeaks scandal).
177 See, e.g., Faulhaber, supra note 34, at 311-12 (noting that countries provide low tax rates and
selectively treat taxpayers to, in part, attract revenues). As mentioned, countries typically raise only a sliver
of tax revenue from artificially shifted income. See, e.g., Gusovsky, supra note 172 (“[T]he Luxembourg tax
on $50 million of interest income running through the country . . . would be less than $100,000.”).
178 Employment increases are likely slight, if not absent, because mobile income shifting does
not involve signiﬁcant ﬁrm investments in, for example, manufacturing plants, which would create
more signiﬁcant employment. See, e.g., Gusovsky, supra note 172 (noting that LuxLeaks involved
companies shifting income to Luxembourg companies with, in the words of Professor Steven
Plotnick, “no tangible activities”); Levin & McCain, supra note 57, at 9-10 (noting that U.S.
multinational income shifting typically involves shell companies, which have no employees and do
not produce goods).
179 See Harrington, supra note 173 (noting the “inﬂux of cash” and boon to jobs and revenues
in countries that establish themselves as tax avoidance centers).
180 Such beneﬁts include an increase in employment and new technologies. See Prakash
Loungani & Assaf Razin, How Beneficial Is Foreign Direct Investment for Developing Countries?, FIN.
& DEV., June 2001, at 6, 7 (describing how FDI leads to the transfer of technology and the
development of the host nation’s human capital through employee training programs).
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In issuing a favorable ruling to F, country j will attempt to maximize its
beneﬁts and minimize its costs. The smaller the tax concession to F, the
greater the diﬀerence between these costs and beneﬁts, as a smaller
concession will yield higher tax revenues and mitigate the perception that
country j is a tax avoidance center. Therefore, the value of the tax concession
aﬀorded to F will likely be just large enough to render country j the proﬁt
maximizing location.
2. Incorporating Action 5’s Tax Ruling Transparency
The previous subsection modeled the necessary conditions for a tax ruling
to induce income shifting as:
|∆tj| > Πk − Πj and uj > cj.

This subsection incorporates the expected consequences of Action 5’s
transparency framework, including the prescribed defensive measures, and
adjusts these necessary conditions to account for these consequences.
Although some advocates suggest that transparency will deter egregious forms
of tax avoidance,181 there is no empirical evidence on the effect of tax ruling
transparency.182 However, incorporating Action 5’s transparency framework
into the above model does not yield any significant theoretical changes to the
conditions required for a tax ruling to induce income shifting. As such, tax
ruling transparency will not result in significant behavioral changes by either
MNEs in utilizing or tax authorities in issuing violative tax rulings.
The OECD BEPS Project’s transparency framework has no theoretical
eﬀect on ﬁrm behavior. As demonstrated above, any favorable tax ruling
decreases a ﬁrm’s tax cost. A decrease in a ﬁrm’s tax cost increases their aftertax proﬁt. For transparency to create behavioral changes, transparency itself
must frustrate the utility of the tax ruling by, for example, imposing a cost on
a ﬁrm accepting the tax concession aﬀorded by the favorable tax ruling.
Because acceptance of a tax concession has no causal relation with a ﬁrm’s
input costs, the only conceivable cost associated with acts of tax avoidance
must be a cost to the ﬁrm’s reputation, denoted r(∆t),183 which could manifest
181 See, e.g., OECD, 2018–2019 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 18, at 9 (noting that transparency
will deter governments from offering “‘sweetheart’ deals” to foreign MNEs); Neubig, supra note 19, at
1140 (“[T]ransparency . . . will discourage the most egregious tax planning activity of MNEs . . . .”).
182 See Neubig, supra note 19, at 1150 (noting that open research opportunities include empirical
analysis of government behavioral changes following greater tax ruling transparency).
183 The reputational harm to a ﬁrm accepting a favorable tax concession is expressed as a
function of the magnitude of the tax concession because as the magnitude of the tax concession
increases so too does the supposed egregiousness of the ﬁrm’s tax avoidance. Therefore, it is rather
apparent that more egregious tax avoidance produces more expected reputational damage from that avoidance.
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itself as injurious to consumer perception of the ﬁrm and thus the ﬁrm’s sales
and its perceived value.184 With the incorporation of reputational harm into
the above model, the tax concession would now have to satisfy
|∆tj| − r(∆tj) > Πk − Πj

for F to shift its income to country j rather than leaving it in country k.
However, the reputational harm stemming from ruling-induced tax avoidance
is minimal, if not nonexistent.185 As such, r(∆tj) roughly equals zero. So, if a
tax concession satisﬁes
|∆tj| > Πk − Πj

when there is no transparency, then it will satisfy
|∆tj| − r(∆tj) > Πk − Πj

when there is tax ruling transparency. Therefore, transparency alone does not
discourage ﬁrms from utilizing favorable tax rulings to shift income.
Moreover, the defensive measures186 authorized by Action 5 cannot
remedy transparency’s inability to aﬀect MNE behavior. The defensive
measures, which include those from the 1998 Report, primarily seek to
combat tax avoidance and base erosion through enhanced CFC rules and their
analogs with respect to non-corporate entities.187 These rules, in theory, stem
avoidance by taxing certain types of income attributable to foreign owned
entities, including income artiﬁcially shifted to utilize favorable tax rulings.
As such, with Action 5’s authorization of defensive measures, there is now
some probability, φ, of F’s residence country taking defensive measures that

184 Birgit Huesecken, Michal Overesch & Alexander Tassius, Eﬀects of Disclosing Tax
Avoidance: Capital Market Reaction to LuxLeaks 1, 16 (Feb. 2018) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2848757 (“Excessive tax avoidance
may . . . lead to reputational consequences, such as consumers choosing to buy from the [tax
avoiding] ﬁrm’s competitors . . . .”).
185 One study analyzed ﬁrm share prices after the LuxLeaks disclosure of conﬁdential tax
rulings issued by Luxembourg and generally found no evidence of reputational harm to ﬁrms. See
id. (manuscript at 6). Even if there is some reputational harm, the harm did not outweigh the
positive eﬀect on ﬁrm value stemming from eﬀective tax planning, which suggests negative publicity
from tax avoidance does not impose net costs on ﬁrms. Id.; see also John Gallemore, Edward L.
Maydew & Jacob R. Thornock, The Reputational Costs of Tax Avoidance, 31 CONTEMP. ACCT. RSCH.
1103, 1105 (2014) (concluding that there is no empirical evidence to support the proposition that tax
avoidance and tax sheltering have reputational consequences for ﬁrms).
186 See supra notes 153–55 and accompanying text.
187 OECD, 1998 REPORT, supra note 7, at 40-42.
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impose some residence country eﬀective tax rate, τ, on F’s post-ruling proﬁt
if F shifts its income to country j.188 Now the tax concession must satisfy
|∆tj| - φτ(|∆tj| + Πj) > Πk − Πj,

which can be simpliﬁed to

(1 - φτ)(|∆tj| + Πj) > Πk.189

However, these anti-tax avoidance rules are often easily circumvented or too
weak to lessen the tax beneﬁts of income shifting.190 As a result, τ is
188 The value of φ depends on whether F’s residence country has existing defensive measures.
If F’s residence country has existing defensive measures, then φ = 1. If F’s residence country has not
already taken defense measures, then φ ∈ [0, 1].
189 This analysis assumes F is risk neutral. This analysis also ignores the possibility that F’s
residence country would take defensive measures if F were to shift its income to country k.
190 See, e.g., supra notes 82–95 and accompanying text; OFF. OF TAX POL’Y, DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY, THE DEFERRAL OF INCOME EARNED THROUGH U.S. CONTROLLED FOREIGN
CORPORATIONS 62-67 (2000) (providing various strategies by which MNEs avoid the Code’s
Subpart F and concluding that Subpart F may be ineﬀective); EUR. COMM’N, TAX POLICIES IN
THE EUROPEAN UNION: 2020 SURVEY 94 (2020) (noting that CFC rules provided in the E.U.
directives could not eliminate “aggressive tax planning”); JOSEPH ISENBERGH & BRET WELLS,
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 370 (4th ed. 2020) (“[T]he Subpart F regime as currently constructed
does generally allow broad latitude to the U.S. [MNEs] to engage in the full range of base erosion
strategies between its [CFCs] when those strategies are directed at the foreign-to-foreign context”);
Fleming Jr. et al., supra note 78, at 1181 (noting that the TCJA did not alter the check-the-box
regulations, which allow taxpayers to avoid Subpart F and taxation under § 951A); Scott D. Dyreng,
Fabio B. Gaertner, Jeﬀrey L. Hoopes & Mary E. Vernon, The Eﬀect of U.S. Tax Reform on the Tax
Burdens of U.S. Domestic and Multinational Corporations 19 (June 2020) (unpublished
manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3620102 (“[F]irms that were
targeted by GILTI [global intangible low-tax income] . . . appear to pay no more federal tax on
foreign earnings in the post-TCJA period than they did in the pre-TCJA period.”); see also OECD,
DESIGNING EFFECTIVE CONTROLLED FOREIGN COMPANY RULES: ACTION 3 – 2015 FINAL
REPORT 9 (2015) (noting that many “existing CFC rules . . . have design features that do not tackle
BEPS eﬀectively” and recommending designs for more eﬀective CFC rules); Kadet, supra note 151,
at 52-53 (explaining that Action 3 does not proﬀer any minimum standards that would create
eﬀective CFC rules); Michael C. Durst, The OECD’s BEPS Project and Lower-Income Countries, 90
TAX NOTES INT’L 1157, 1168-69 (2018) (noting that political pressures have rendered CFC rules
“relatively toothless” and the OECD “ma[de] no move toward advocacy of a global network of strict
CFC rules as a primary goal of the BEPS project”); Barry Larking, What the World Thinks of Pillar
2, 98 TAX NOTES INT’L 185, 187 (noting a general consensus implying that existing CFC rules
cannot combat proﬁt shifting); Sebastian Beer, Ruud de Mooij & Li Liu, International Corporate Tax
Avoidance: A Review of the Channels, Magnitudes, and Blind Spots 7 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working
Paper No. 18/168, 2018) (noting the ability of MNEs to avoid residence country CFC rules through
corporate inversions); Letter from Jeﬀery M. Kadet, Professor of Law, Univ. of Wash. Sch. of L., to
the Task Force on the Digit. Econ., Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev. 11 (Oct. 11, 2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3053366 (“It is clear that CFC and transfer
pricing rules have been ineﬀective in either curbing MNE enthusiasm for proﬁt shifting or in
seriously countering its eﬀects.”); Daniel Bunn, Ripple Eﬀects from Controlled Foreign Corporation
Rules, TAX FOUND. (June 13, 2019), https://taxfoundation.org/controlled-foreign-corporation-rules-
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negligible, and thus F, despite the possibility of encountering Action 5’s
defensive measures, will shift its income to country j when
|∆tj| > Πk − Πj.

As such, residence country defensive measures will not deter ﬁrms from
utilizing favorable tax rulings to avoid tax by shifting income.191
The Action 5 transparency framework may induce some country
behavioral changes, although the expected changes are negligible. For
instance, greater transparency may increase countries’ possible political costs.
The country cost parameter in the model above primarily consisted of
political costs. With greater tax ruling transparency, the expected political
costs are greater than in a scenario where there is no transparency.192 So,
considering the above model, Action 5 will increase the costs to country j
from issuing a ruling by some amount ∆cj. As such, country j will issue the
ruling when
uj > cj + ∆cj.

However, widespread tax avoidance activity, let alone isolated instances
of favorable tax treatment, does not generally elicit any significant directed
responses from aﬀected jurisdictions.193 Moreover, given that such
concessions would likely deviate from OECD BEPS Project Actions,
aﬀording such concessions would violate the country’s commitment to the
OECD BEPS Project. Generally, violations of international agreements and
eﬀects [https://perma.cc/U45U-U8B2] (explaining how MNEs avoid the CFC rules of various
jurisdictions by “bunching” subsidiary income in those jurisdictions).
191 The 1998 Report also authorizes the restriction of participation exemptions, which are the
primary mechanism by which territorial tax systems exclude foreign income from tax. See OECD, 1998
REPORT, supra note 7, at 43; POMERLEAU, supra note 52 (noting that before the passage of the TCJA,
twenty-nine of thirty-five OECD members had participation exemptions). The Code, for example,
exempts foreign source income by providing a deduction for dividends received from foreign
corporations. See I.R.C. § 245A(a). However, a participation exemption restriction is even less effective
than CFC rules. If the United States restricted the application of § 245A as a defensive measure, then
foreign corporations would forgo paying dividends to their U.S. parents, as this tactic would simply
defer U.S. tax. And over a long enough period of time, deferral can effectively be complete avoidance.
As such, participation exemption restrictions cannot effectively combat tax avoidance.
192 See Neubig, supra note 19, at 1148-49 (observing that exposure of favorable tax rulings has
caused some jurisdictions to alter their tax laws and practices).
193 See, e.g., Bowers, supra note 176 (observing that four and a half years following LuxLeaks,
the Commission had “failed to investigate a single Lux Leaks tax ruling”); Cayman Islands, supra
note 175 (observing that the E.U. placed the Cayman Islands on the “EU blacklist” for the perceived
absence of measures to ensure economic substance with respect to the taxation of collective
investment vehicles but noting that blacklist will have little eﬀect on Cayman Island funds’ ability
to raise foreign capital).
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collaborative eﬀorts adversely impact a country’s reputation. But because the
OECD BEPS Project is soft law, deviations from its terms would not cause
signiﬁcant reputational damage.194 As such, the political costs resulting from
transparency will likely only deter countries from issuing egregiously
favorable tax rulings. But the prevalence of such rulings is small, if not
negligible, and a ruling need not be extraordinarily egregious to induce a
foreign MNE to shift income to that jurisdiction. As such, ∆cj will generally
be negligible such that it will approximately equal zero. So, if the ruling satisfies
uj > cj,

then it too will also satisfy
uj > cj + ∆cj.

Therefore, heightened political costs and pressures from issuing violative tax
rulings in a scenario with transparency are insuﬃcient to deter countries from
issuing such rulings.
Moreover, even if increased transparency lessens the secretive nature of
issued tax rulings, tax rulings are still the ideal method to induce income shifting.
As mentioned, countries hoping to induce income shifting favor tax rulings, in
part, because they can be issued more discretely than amending domestic tax
law.195 Although tax ruling transparency certainly reduces this secrecy, tax
rulings are nevertheless effective at attracting income shifting because of the
other advantages that they have over tax law changes.196 In addition, even with
transparency requirements, tax rulings still remain more discrete than domestic
tax law changes because Action 5 requires an information exchange with only a
194 See Timothy Meyer, Power, Exit Costs, and Renegotiation in International Law, 51 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 379, 394-95, 397 (2010) (equating exit provisions to soft law agreements, noting that exit
provisions in international agreements allow for countries to leave such agreements without
suﬀering reputational harm, and implying that the distinction between exit and violations of
agreements is relevant only if there is a desire to renegotiate the existing agreement); see also Andrew
T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, International Soft Law, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 171, 183-84 (2010)
(noting that one reason why states may choose soft law because they prefer to lower the costs of
avoiding their obligations stemming from the agreement under certain conditions). Additionally, it
appears that inadequate compliance with Action 5 does not result in material reputational costs to
noncompliant countries as the most recent BEPS Progress Report indicates that thirty-two
jurisdictions have not yet implemented the OECD’s recommended changes to their exchange
practices. OECD, 2019–2020 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 18, at 16. Given the extent to which
the OECD and BEPS Project supporters champion transparency as a highly eﬀective tool to stem
the use of rulings to aﬀord unwarranted tax concessions, one would expect that, assuming
reputational costs of noncompliance were material, these countries would have already implemented
the OECD’s recommendations.
195 See supra notes 165–67 and accompanying text.
196 See supra notes 165–66 and accompanying text.
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limited number of parties.197 Therefore, even when subject to greater tax ruling
transparency requirements, countries are unlikely to use an alternative
mechanism to induce foreign MNE income shifting.
Finally, Action 5’s defensive measures will not aﬀect the supply of tax
rulings. After F’s residence country takes defensive measures, country j may
no longer be the optimal location for F to continue to shift its income. If F
then begins shifting its income elsewhere, country j will not fully realize the
estimated beneﬁts of F’s income shifting, uj. More speciﬁcally, country j will
not realize some portion α ∈ [0, 1] of these beneﬁts. As the probability of F’s
residence country taking defensive measures is φ, the ruling’s beneﬁts to
country j must satisfy
uj - φαuj > cj,
which can be simpliﬁed to
(1 - φα)uj > cj.198
However, to actually reduce the beneﬁts to country j from issuing a
favorable tax ruling, the defensive measures must deter income shifting.
Because they do not, defensive measures will not induce F to shift its income
elsewhere. Therefore, α is approximately zero. So, if the benefits to country j satisfy
uj > cj,
then they will also satisfy
(1 - φα)uj > cj.
As such, Action 5’s defensive measures will not deter countries from issuing
violative tax rulings.
Furthermore, while transparency not only fails to limit the prevalence of
favorable tax rulings, it may also produce a more perverse consequence. The
OECD BEPS Project’s transparency framework can make countries that
compete with each other through taxes to attract foreign investment199 aware of
one another’s rulings.200 More publicly available rulings better illuminate the
See OECD, ACTION 5 – 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, at 53 tbl.53.
As with MNEs, this analysis assumes that countries are risk neutral.
OECD, 1998 REPORT, supra note 7, ¶ 27; Faulhaber, supra note 34, at 311.
For general rulings, the OECD suggests that the granting country make the ruling publicly
available. OECD, ACTION 5 – 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, ¶ 141. For taxpayer-speciﬁc
rulings, the OECD suggests the issuing country share the ruling with the relevant countries, which
depends on the type of ruling issued. Id.
197
198
199
200
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types rulings that may induce foreign MNEs to shift income. As such,
transparency can actually uncover opportunities and methods for countries to
compete for foreign MNE income through tax rulings. Because the transparency
framework requires countries to exchange the subject matter of the ruling and
the transaction amount,201 countries can more effectively “bid” for the foreign
MNE’s income. As a result, transparency can actually turn tax rulings into a
global auction, increasing the prevalence of favorable tax rulings.202
B. The Complementarity of Transparency and Disgorgement
Alone, Action 5’s tax ruling transparency likely elicits negligible or no
behavioral responses from either MNEs or countries. Coupled with a
disgorgement mechanism, however, transparency creates signiﬁcant
behavioral changes, because their combination frustrates the utility of
favorable tax rulings. In fact, following the implementation of Action 5 and
E.U. tax ruling transparency measures, one commentator concluded that
enhanced transparency would bolster E.U. state aid law enforcement in taxrelated cases.203 The above model can explain these expected eﬀects.
1. Complementarity and the Magnitude of the Tax Concession
Transparency and disgorgement together tend to aﬀect ﬁrm behavior
rather than country behavior. In the above model, without transparency or
the possibility of disgorgement, or with transparency alone, F will shift its
operations to country j if the tax concession satisﬁes
|∆tj| > Πk − Πj.

However, the possibility that F will be forced to disgorge country j’s oﬀered
tax concession alters this inequality. By creating the possibility of
disgorgement, there is some probability p ∈ [0, 1] that F can keep the aﬀorded

201 Id. ¶¶ 130-31 (describing information exchanges); id. annex C at 74-79 (providing template
forms with which to conduct exchanges).
202 Cf. Alexandre Mas, Does Disclosure Aﬀect CEO Pay Setting?: Evidence from the Passage of the
1934 Securities and Exchange Act 1 (Indus. Rels. Section, Princeton Univ., Working Paper No. 632,
2019), https://dataspace.princeton.edu/handle/88435/dsp010k225d92n (noting that executive
compensation increased following mandatory public disclosure of compensation even though the
purpose of disclosure was to serve as a check on the level of compensation).
203 See William Hoke, Country Digest, Tax Transparency Directive Adds Value, European
Commission Says, 95 TAX NOTES INT’L 1298, 1298 (2019) (“[T]ougher tax transparency rules are
adding value for member states . . . .”).
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concession.204 The probability p is a function of both the magnitude of the tax
concession, |∆tj|, and the characteristics of the ruling, denoted y, with the
latter primarily contemplating the degree of the ruling’s deviation from the
issuing country’s normal tax laws or OECD standards, including the OECD
BEPS Project Actions.205 With transparency and the possibility of
disgorgement, the expected value of the tax concession—the magnitude of the
concession multiplied by the probability F can keep the concession—must be
greater than the diﬀerence in proﬁt from shifting income to country j, rather
than merely the concession’s magnitude in the scenario where there is no
disgorgement mechanism. Accordingly, the tax concession must instead
satisfy
|∆tj| × p(|∆tj|, y) > Πk − Πj

to induce F to shift its income to country j.206
The probability that a ﬁrm can keep the aﬀorded tax concession is
inversely related to the magnitude of the concession. This is because a
relatively larger tax concession is prima facie more violative of the
disgorgement mechanism’s substantive guidelines, especially in the context of
E.U. state aid law and the substantive backdrop of a hypothetical BEPSfocused disgorgement mechanism. In the E.U. state aid law context, any
increase in the magnitude of the tax concession is prima facie more
anticompetitive and thus more likely subject to disgorgement.207 The same is
expected under a hypothetical BEPS-focused disgorgement mechanism. As
the magnitude of the tax concession increases, the ruling is more likely to give
rise to general BEPS concerns because it would be more likely to induce
artiﬁcial proﬁt shifting. This type of income shifting is the primary focus of
the OECD BEPS Project.208 As a result, a larger tax concession would more
likely be subject to disgorgement. Therefore, relatively larger tax concessions

204 See, e.g., Allison Christians, Friends with Tax Benefits: Apple’s Cautionary Tale, 78 TAX NOTES
INT’L 1031, 1034 (2015) (noting that the E.U. state aid case against Ireland “raises the stakes” for
MNE tax planning as there is reason to doubt that privately arranged deals will survive scrutiny).
205 The interplay between transparency and the content of the ruling is discussed in infra
subsection II.B.2.
206 The remainder of this subsection will only consider the tax concession’s magnitude to
analyze transparency and disgorgement. Consideration of the content of the ruling is discussed infra
subsection II.B.2.
207 As mentioned, E.U. state aid law generally disallows E.U. Member States to grant any
forms of aid or subsidies that “distort[]” competition among market participants. See TFEU, supra
note 25, art. 107(1).
208 See What Is BEPS?, supra note 14 (“Countries now have the tools to ensure that proﬁts are
taxed where economic activities generating the proﬁts are performed and where value is created.”).
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are prima facie more violative of the relevant disgorgement mechanism’s
substantive backdrop.
The eﬀect of the concession’s magnitude on the probability that an MNE
can keep the aﬀorded tax concession limits the expected value of the
concession to some ﬁnite number, regardless of its actual value. Because the
probability that a ﬁrm can keep the aﬀorded concession is inversely related
to the magnitude of the concession, the expected value will be “bounded
below” some number. That is, there exists some number by which the
expected value of a given concession aﬀorded by a tax ruling cannot exceed
as |∆tj| increases from zero to inﬁnity. If this number is less than diﬀerence
in proﬁt between the possible income locations, then F will not shift its
income regardless of how large |∆tj| is.
A simple numerical example illustrates this point. Consider p as only a
function of |∆tj|, or p(|∆tj|). Further, let p(|∆tj|) be deﬁned as
*

p: [0, ∞] → [0, 1] given by p(|∆tj|) = *+|∆&)|.

Accordingly, as |∆tj| increases from 0 to inﬁnity, the probability that F
can keep the tax concession aﬀorded by the ruling ranges from 1 to 0. The
magnitude of the tax concession must now be multiplied by p(|∆tj|) to
determine the expected value of the concession to F. This can be expressed
as a function, denoted V(|∆tj|) given by
|∆&)|

|∆tj| × p(|∆tj|) = *+|∆&)|.

Similar to p(|∆tj|), V(|∆tj|) ranges from 0 to 1 as |∆tj| increases from 0 to
inﬁnity. In other words, V(|∆tj|) is bounded below 1. Therefore,
if Πk − Πj > 1, then V(|∆tj|) < Πk − Πj

for all tax concessions aﬀorded by a ruling, even if the concession’s dollar
value is inﬁnite. As such, a tax ruling would not be able to induce F to shift
its income to country j rather than leaving it in country k.
This example is generalizable to other instances where p(|∆tj|) is similarly

expressed. Let p(|∆tj|) be given as

*

|∆&)|

, and V(|∆tj|) be given as *+.|∆&)|,

*+.|∆&)|

where z > 0 although it is likely that 1 > z > 0.209 Accordingly, p(|∆tj|) still
209

)

The reason z is likely between 0 and 1 is because V(|∆tj|) is bounded below . Even with a
*

disgorgement mechanism there will likely still remain instances where a tax ruling will be able to
successfully induce income shifting and in those instances it is highly unlikely that the diﬀerence in
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ranges from 1 to 0 as |∆tj| increases from 0 to inﬁnity, and V(|∆tj|) ranges

from 0 to

*

.

as |∆tj| increases from 0 to inﬁnity. Similar to the previous
*

example, V(|∆tj|) is now bounded below ., and a tax ruling cannot induce F

to shift its income to country j if

*

.

< Πk − Πj.

This theoretical limit on the expected value of any given tax concession,
however, does not incorporate an additional constraint accounted for by the
model. Country j will issue a ruling to F only if uj > cj. As mentioned, the
benefits to country j from issuing the ruling are primarily increased tax
revenues, as country j can still extract some tax from F despite the afforded
concession. However, a disgorgement mechanism requires an increase in the
magnitude of the afforded tax concession to induce income shifting.
Consequently, the disgorgement mechanism requires a larger outlay by country
j that reduces country j’s possible benefits from F’s income shifting relative to
a situation where there is no such mechanism. If the necessary tax concession
exceeds country j’s net benefits, then country j will not issue a ruling to induce
income shifting. This constrains the maximum possible tax concession as it
cannot exceed the net benefits to country j. So, |∆tj| can only range from 0 to
(uj-cj-𝜀𝜀), where 𝜀𝜀 is some arbitrarily small positive number.210 Because (uj-cj-𝜀𝜀)
is the maximum possible value of |∆tj|, V(uj-cj-𝜀𝜀) must exceed Πk − Πj for a tax
ruling to induce income shifting. Therefore, even in instances where
*

if

.

> Πk − Πj,

Πk − Πj > V(uj-cj-𝜀𝜀),

then a tax ruling will be unable to induce income shifting. Because the
possibility of disgorgement requires a larger concession, it is more likely that
the magnitude of this concession required to induce income shifting will
exceed (uj-cj-𝜀𝜀) than in a scenario without a disgorgement mechanism.
Accordingly, disgorgement can frustrate tax ruling-induced income shifting
proﬁt between two possible jurisdictions is 1 or less. Accordingly, z being between 0 and 1 will be
able to account for such instances.
210 The inclusion of 𝜀𝜀 ensures that the maximum possible oﬀered tax concession does not
completely eliminate the net beneﬁts to country j from issuing the ruling. This would render country
j indiﬀerent to oﬀering the ruling.
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by eﬀectively inhibiting the satisfaction of the necessary conditions for
ruling-induced income shifting.
The above conclusions have not considered the eﬀect of tax ruling
transparency. Without transparency, the body responsible for seeking
disgorgement does not as productively identify tax rulings that may violate
substantive guidelines with which rulings must comply. In the context of E.U.
state aid, for instance, without disclosure or notiﬁcation by the issuing
country, the enforcing body needs to either receive a tip from a third party or
have suspicion leading to a serendipitous discovery of a violative tax ruling.211
Tax ruling transparency gives the enforcing body full and immediate access
to all issued tax rulings. Accordingly, transparency increases the enforcing
body’s sensitivity to the magnitude of the aﬀorded tax concession relative to
a situation where there is no transparency. This, in turn, reduces the number
below which the maximum expected value of a tax concession is bounded.
Using the generalized example of the expected value function above,
transparency helps minimize this threshold by aﬀecting the scalar value z. In
*

the example, the expected value of the tax concession is bounded below . as

|∆tj| increases from 0 to (uj-cj-𝜀𝜀); in other words, the expected value of the
*

tax concession will never exceed . As mentioned, the relevant enforcing
.

body’s sensitivity to the size of the tax concession aﬀorded by the ruling
increases when tax ruling transparency complements the disgorgement
mechanism. As such, transparency increases the value z to 𝑧𝑧̂ . As such,
transparency changes the expected value function to
|∆&)|
𝑉𝑉. (|∆tj|) = *+.̂ |∆&)|.

Accordingly, transparency thus decreases the maximum expected value of
*

an inﬁnitely large tax concession aﬀorded by a tax ruling as is strictly greater
.
*

than .̂ . Moreover, because the maximum concession cannot exceed (uj-cj-𝜀𝜀)
regardless of tax ruling transparency,

V(uj-cj-𝜀𝜀) > 𝑉𝑉. (uj-cj-𝜀𝜀).

211 See Mason, supra note 27, at 455 (explaining the Commission’s investigative procedure when it
suspects a Member State has granted “so-called unnotified aid”); e.g., Giraud & Petit, supra note 29, at
233 (observing the Commission’s increased ruling-related state aid investigations following LuxLeaks.)

2021]

Is Sunlight the Best Disinfectant?

1589

As such, the diﬀerence in proﬁt between the two possible income
locations must be smaller for a tax ruling to induce income shifting.
Accordingly, as long as there are instances where
V(uj-cj-𝜀𝜀) > Πk − Πj and 𝑉𝑉. (uj-cj-𝜀𝜀) < Πk − Πj,

transparency will reduce the number of instances where a tax ruling can
induce income shifting when complementing a disgorgement mechanism.
As mentioned, the above examples provide only one conception about
what the function p(|∆tj|) could be. But the true probability function need
not take the exact form in the provided examples to stem tax ruling-induced
income shifting. Because the probability that an MNE can keep the tax
concession aﬀorded by a ruling decreases as the magnitude of the ruling
increases, the expected value of the concession will always be bounded below
some number. As long as this number is less than the diﬀerence in pre-ruling
proﬁt between two locations, a ruling will not induce income shifting. As
such, transparency coupled with a disgorgement mechanism produces a set of
instances where tax rulings are no longer an eﬀective means to induce income
shifting, and it can be expected that transparency will reduce the number of
instances where rulings can induce income shifting.
2. Complementarity and the Content of the Tax Ruling
Thus far, the discussion has analyzed the impact of tax ruling transparency
on a disgorgement mechanism considering only the magnitude of the tax
concession afforded. However, as previously stated, the probability that a firm
can keep the afforded tax concession is not only a function of the concession’s
monetary value but also the subject matter of the ruling itself. In other words,
how the ruling decreases an MNE’s tax liability also influences this probability.
The content of a ruling influences the probability that an MNE can keep
a tax concession afforded by a ruling. Consider the following example.
Suppose a non-U.S. MNE, F. Corp., wants to shift interest income to the
United States to avoid current taxation on this income in its home country. To
do so, suppose F. Corp. incorporates a subsidiary in the United States, U.S.
Sub. F. Corp. contributes cash to U.S. Sub upon its incorporation, and U.S.
Sub proceeds to open a bank account in the U.S. and deposit the cash in the
account. Suppose further that F. Corp. shifted this interest income because
the IRS issued a ruling simply providing that the interest income received by
U.S. Sub is not subject to U.S. tax. Such a ruling would significantly deviate
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from clearly defined U.S. tax law.212 Accordingly, if this ruling were subject to
disgorgement and U.S. tax law was part of the disgorgement mechanism’s
substantive backdrop for this particular case, the probability that F. Corp. and
U.S. Sub can keep the tax concession would certainly be very low, regardless
of the size of the concession.
As such, the content of the ruling warrants consideration when determining
the probability that a firm can keep an afforded concession. Considering the
generalized example of a probability function in the previous subsection, the
content of the ruling imposes a new variable y, which can be considered a
function itself whose value is determined by the content of the ruling at issue
and whose value affects the probability that an MNE can keep the afforded tax
concession. As such, this probability is now expressed in its entirety as
*

p(|∆tj|, y)) = *+0.|∆&)|.213

This probability ranges from 1 to 0 as |∆tj| ranges from 0 to inﬁnity.
Accordingly, the expected value of a tax concession aﬀorded by a ruling is
|∆&)|

V(|∆tj|, y) = *+0.|∆&)|.
*

Now, instead of V(|∆tj|, y) ranging from 0 to . as |∆tj| ranges from 0 to

inﬁnity, V(|∆tj|, y) ranges from 0 to

*

0.

. Accordingly, the value y has

signiﬁcant importance for determining the theoretical maximum expected
value of a tax concession and thus whether tax rulings can induce income
shifting, regardless of the magnitude of the aﬀorded concession and relevant
enforcement body’s sensitivity to this magnitude.
The content of the ruling’s effect on the probability that an MNE can keep
an afforded tax concession depends on the extent to which the ruling
identifiably deviates from the applicable rules underlying the disgorgement
mechanism. This in turn depends on how well-defined these rules are. If the

212 See I.R.C. § 61(a)(4) (“[G]ross income . . . includ[es] . . . [i]nterest . . . .”); Treas. Reg. § 1.617(a) (as amended in 1966) (“As a general rule, interest received by or credited to the taxpayer constitutes
gross income and is fully taxable. Interest income includes interest on . . . bank deposits . . . .”).
213 It is important to distinguish between the two scalar values in this function. The values z
and 𝑧𝑧̂ capture the relevant enforcing body’s sensitivity to the magnitude of the tax concession. The
two values z and 𝑧𝑧̂ are exhaustive of what this scalar value can be, as z applies when there is no tax
ruling transparency and 𝑧𝑧̂ applies when there is tax ruling transparency, such as in a hypothetical
BEPS-focused disgorgement mechanism incorporating Action 5. The value y, while implicitly
serving as a scalar value, can be considered a function of the content of the ruling by which the
content imputes some numerical value for y. Accordingly, y depends on the particular tax ruling at
issue and theoretically has inﬁnite possible values.
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applicable tax rules are vague and the ruling deviates only slightly, the value y
will be relatively small. Because in the absence of transparency the maximum
*

value of V(|∆tj|, y) is 0. (ignoring the constraint on the magnitude of the tax

concession of (uj-cj-𝜀𝜀)), a relatively small value y imputes a relatively large
maximum value of V(|∆tj|, y). This would necessarily lead to more instances
where a tax ruling can induce income shifting. Conversely, if the disgorgement
mechanism has more well-defined rules, even minor deviations would impute
a relatively high value of y. Considering the example of F. Corp. and U.S. Sub,
if the ruling more subtly immunized the interest income from tax by, for
example, recasting the interest as some other item of income excluded from
“gross income” under I.R.C. § 61, the deviation from the applicable U.S. tax
law would be less extreme relative to the original example. However, such a
ruling would still violate U.S. tax law because the transaction between the bank
and U.S. Sub can only be properly characterized as a payment of interest on a
bank deposit. And if U.S. tax law served as part of the disgorgement
mechanism’s substantive backdrop in that case, even this subtler deviation
would impute a relatively large value of y and, as such, a relatively low
maximum value of V(|∆tj|, y). Accordingly, the more well-defined the
substantive rules undergirding the relevant disgorgement mechanism, the
more identifiable a ruling’s deviations from these rules and the less likely that
ruling can be used to induce income shifting.
Transparency essentially compounds the ruling content’s eﬀect on the
probability that an MNE can keep an aﬀorded concession. In general, tax
ruling transparency provides the relevant enforcing body with all issued
rulings that meet the exchange requirements. In the OECD BEPS Project
context, Action 5 requires this exchange of tax rulings, as well as information
such as the type of ruling issued214 and a short summary of the issue covered
by the ruling.215 Action 5 also recommends exchanging additional information
including the value of the transaction at issue in the ruling and the recipient
entity’s proﬁt.216 Similar to the eﬀect transparency has with respect to the
magnitude of the aﬀorded concession, greater transparency pertaining to the
content of the ruling eﬀectively grants the relevant enforcement body greater
access to issued rulings and allows them to more eﬀectively scrutinize rulings’
214 In other words, the issuing country must identify which of the six categories of rulings
subject to exchange the issued ruling corresponds to.
215 See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
216 OECD, ACTION 5 – 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, annex C at 75-76.
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content. Accordingly, the enforcement body’s sensitivity to rulings’ content
increases and each issued ruling is prima facie less likely to withstand this
body’s examination.
Transparency’s eﬀect on the enforcement body’s sensitivity to rulings’
content decreases the expected value of any given tax concession. In the
presence of transparency, the value y for the particular ruling increases to 𝑦𝑦0
such that y > 𝑦𝑦0. Accordingly, the expected value function in the presence of
transparency must incorporate this eﬀect on the value y, and therefore this
function can be expressed as
|∆&)|
𝑉𝑉. (|∆tj|, 𝑦𝑦0) = *+01.̂ |∆&)|.
*

This function is therefore bounded below 01.̂ as |∆tj| ranges from 0 to inﬁnity.

Moreover, transparency reduces the expected value of the maximum
concession that can be aﬀorded as
V((uj-cj-𝜀𝜀), y) > 𝑉𝑉.((uj-cj-𝜀𝜀), 𝑦𝑦0),

notwithstanding transparency’s eﬀect on the relevant enforcing body’s
sensitivity to the magnitude of the aﬀorded concession. Similar to
transparency’s eﬀect on the sensitivity to the magnitude of the aﬀorded
concession, its eﬀect with respect to the content of the ruling thus necessitates
a smaller diﬀerence in proﬁt between two locations to induce income shifting.
As such, as long as there are instances where

and

V((uj-cj-𝜀𝜀), y) > Πk − Πj
𝑉𝑉. ((uj-cj-𝜀𝜀), 𝑦𝑦0) < Πk − Πj,

transparency’s eﬀect with respect to the content of rulings will reduce the
number of instances where rulings can induce income shifting.
Even if the true probability function does not take the same form
expressed throughout this Section, in the context of a hypothetical BEPSfocused disgorgement mechanism, the introduction of a transparency
framework comparable to Action 5’s will reduce the number of instances where
a tax ruling can induce income shifting. Whatever the true probability
function’s construct, transparency’s effect with respect to the content of the
ruling will produce the same result because the content of the ruling affects
whether a ruling can stand after examination. Without enhanced disclosure, it
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is more difficult to uncover the existence of rulings and easier for countries to
issue vague rulings that can both induce income shifting and avoid detection
by the disgorgement mechanism’s enforcement body. With enhanced
disclosure, it becomes easier to both discover the existence of issued rulings
and compare the rulings’ subject matter with the relevant substantive backdrop
of the disgorgement mechanism. This results in more effective identification
of those rulings whose characteristics violate this backdrop and lead to BEPS
issues. Therefore, enhanced disclosure of ruling content will also help to
decrease the efficacy of using rulings to induce income shifting and serves as
another means by which tax ruling transparency complements disgorgement.
III. IMPLEMENTING A BEPS-FOCUSED DISGORGEMENT
MECHANISM
The preceding section demonstrated the theoretical ineffectiveness of
transparency alone and the theoretical effectiveness of pairing transparency
and a disgorgement mechanism. To effectuate the expected behavioral changes
of the OECD BEPS Project and in particular Action 5’s transparency
framework, a BEPS-focused disgorgement mechanism should be
implemented. Adhering to this proposal is realistic because a similar
mechanism exists to enforce E.U. state aid law.217 Although E.U. state aid law’s
procedural aspects are advantageous, its substantive aspects are not well suited
to handle the issues contemplated by the OECD BEPS Project because tax
ruling-induced income shifting arguably complies with state aid law. The
proposed disgorgement mechanism, while procedurally analogous to E.U.
state aid law enforcement, will use the issuing country’s tax laws and the
substantive guidelines of the OECD BEPS Project and other OECD
guidance to reduce the prevalence of tax ruling-induced income shifting.
A. An Analysis of E.U. State Aid Law
In general, E.U. state aid law deals with competition among E.U. Member
States. State aid law eﬀectively limits the extent to which Member States can
subsidize business218 to prevent the distortion of competition within the E.U.
internal market.219 Although state aid law initially aimed to prevent

See supra notes 24–27 and accompanying text.
Mason, supra note 27, at 451.
Ana Pošćić, Procedural Aspects of EU State Aid Law, in PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF EU LAW
490, 490 (Dunja Duić & Tunjica Petrašević eds., 2017) (“In EU law, any aid, which distorts or
threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain
goods, is prohibited, as far as it aﬀects trade between Member States.”).
217
218
219
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protectionism, it now covers harmful tax competition practices, including
inappropriate uses of tax rulings.220
1. Substantive State Aid Law and Its Application to Tax Rulings
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) describes
state aid as “any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in
any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by
favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods.”221
Although the TFEU states that such state aid “shall, in so far as it aﬀects
trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal market,” it
does not prohibit all subsidies provided by Member States.222 Some measures
are explicitly deemed compatible with the internal market223 while others are
considered potentially compatible.224 The European Commission is the body
responsible for enforcing state aid law and challenging aid’s compatibility
with the internal market.225
The European Commission and E.U. courts use a four-element test to
determine whether a governmental measure constitutes state aid.226 First, the
measure must be a state intervention or a use of state resources.227 Second,
the measure must be liable to aﬀect trade between Member States.228 Third,
the measure must provide a “selective advantage” to the recipient.229 Finally,
the measure must “distort or threaten to distort competition.”230
The third element, selective advantage, is generally subdivided into its
component parts: selectivity and advantage. A measure is selective when
directed at speciﬁc undertakings or types of goods.231 Selectivity can be either
de jure or de facto depending upon how the Member State grants the
measure.232 A measure provides an advantage when it bestows an economic

220 See Commission Notice on State Aid, supra note 26, ¶ 170 (noting that tax rulings must conform
to state-aid law to avoid “confer[ring] a selective advantage”); accord Mason, supra note 27, at 452.
221 TFEU, supra note 25, art. 107(1).
222 Id.
223 See id. art. 107(2) (outlining categories of state aid deemed “compatible with the internal
market,” such as aid to rectify damage from natural disasters).
224 See id. art. 107(3) (outlining categories of state aid which “may be considered to be compatible
with the internal market,” such as aid to promote economic development in poorer regions).
225 TFEU, supra note 25, art. 108(1).
226 See Case T-760/15, Kingdom of the Neth. v. Comm’n, ECLI:EU:T:2019:669, ¶ 127 (Sept. 24,
2019) (citing Case C-524/14, Comm’n v. Hansestadt Lübeck, ECLI:EU:C:2016:971, ¶ 40 (Dec. 21, 2016)).
227 Id.
228 Id.
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 Pošćić, supra note 219, at 490.
232 See Commission Notice on State Aid, supra note 26, ¶¶ 121-22.
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beneﬁt only available through state intervention in an undertaking.233 The
European Commission generally uses the “market economy operator” test to
identify an advantage.234 Under this test, a Member State confers an
advantage when it has not “acted as a market economy operator would have
done in a similar situation.”235 In other words, the test asks whether a private
investor could have been induced to make the same investment as the
Member State.236
Tax rulings are regulated by state aid law, but they are not prima facie
violative of it.237 Disagreements over the subject matter of tax rulings do
occur between the European Commission and Member States, however, and
disputes usually focus on selectivity and advantage.238 According to the
European Commission, a tax ruling may confer an advantage when it
decreases the ruling recipient’s tax liability below the level that would result
from an ordinary application of the Member State’s tax laws.239 As a result,
the Commission often uses the Member State’s regularly applied tax regime
as the baseline for determining the existence of an advantage.240 Some have
noted that once the European Commission ﬁnds a tax ruling confers an
advantage, a ﬁnding of selectivity naturally follows.241
See id. ¶ 74.
Id. ¶ 75 (emphasis omitted).
Id. ¶ 76.
See id. ¶ 74; accord Mason, supra note 27, at 452.
See Commission Notice on State Aid, supra note 26, ¶ 169 (noting that Member States can
provide “legal certainty and predictability” to their taxpayers through tax rulings).
238 See, e.g., Case T-760/15, Kingdom of the Neth. v. Comm’n, ECLI:EU:T:2019:669, ¶ 128
(Sept. 24, 2019) (“[T]he Netherlands and Starbucks do not dispute the assessment made by the
Commission regarding [the ﬁrst, second and fourth elements of the state aid analysis] . . . . The[ir]
ﬁrst four pleas . . . seek, in essence, to call into question the Commission’s ﬁnding that [the
challenged tax ruling] conferred a selective advantage . . . .”); see also Mason, supra note 27, at 452
(“Under the current state of development of EU law, tax subsidies easily satisfy all the elements [of
state aid] except for advantage and selectivity . . . .”); accord Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis, The
Cracks in the European Commission’s Apple Case, 154 TAX NOTES 55, 60-61 (2017) (noting that “[i]n
most tax cases, the sole question is selectivity” and although a Member State’s tax rulings are not
per se selective, “[tax] rulings are the primary mechanism to grant advantageous deals to taxpayers”);
Kyle Richard, Are All Tax Rulings State Aid? Examining the European Commission’s Recent State Aid
Decisions, 18 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 1, 15-16 (2018) (noting that, in state aid cases challenging
Member State tax rulings, advantage and selectivity are the only elements in dispute).
239 See Commission Notice on State Aid, supra note 26, ¶ 170.
240 Mason, supra note 27, at 453. In addition, the Commission has recently embraced the “arm’s
length” standard to determine whether a tax ruling provides an advantage. See Richard, supra note
238, at 16; see also Ruth Mason, Special Report, Tax Rulings as State Aid – Part 4: Whose Arm’s-Length
Standard?, 155 TAX NOTES 947, 951 (2017) (describing the use of an arm’s length standard in recent
tax ruling state aid cases involving transfer pricing and profit allocation). The arm’s length standard
is a recent development in state aid law, and its use has garnered significant criticism. See id. at 951,
963 (noting the Treasury’s claims that the arm’s length standard undermines the BEPS Project).
241 See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S RECENT STATE AID
INVESTIGATIONS OF TRANSFER PRICING RULES 8 (2016) (noting that in the recent significant state
233
234
235
236
237
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In recent years, the European Commission has increased the number of
state aid cases concerning tax rulings.242 Some high-proﬁle cases involved
MNEs such as Apple, Starbucks, and Fiat.243 In the Apple state aid case,
involving the rulings described earlier,244 the European Commission initially
ordered Ireland to recover approximately €13 billion in “undue” tax
beneﬁts,245 but the European Union General Court (GCEU) ultimately
decided the appeal in favor of Apple and Ireland.246 The Starbucks state aid
case involved an APA issued by the Netherlands, which Starbucks won on
appeal.247 The Fiat state aid case, however, involved a Luxembourg ruling
approving a level of payment for services rendered to it and the European
Commission won its case on appeal.248
2. The Procedural Aspects of State Aid Law Enforcement
Generally, the preliminary procedural steps for state aid cases depend on
the type of aid involved. For “notiﬁed aid”—aid that Member States plan to
grant—Article 108 of the TFEU requires all Member States to notify the
European Commission.249 Notiﬁcation of plans to grant aid triggers a
preliminary investigation, but the Commission can also approve the Member
State’s plans after applying the “simpliﬁed procedure.”250 After the
preliminary investigation, the Commission either decides that there is no aid
within the meaning of E.U. rules, that the aid is compatible with the internal

aid cases involving tax rulings, once the Commission found the rulings provided an advantage
because they deviated from the “arm’s length principle,” a ﬁnding of selectivity followed). Ruth
Mason distinguishes between tax rulings as individual aid and general aid and notes that once
advantage is demonstrated in individual aid cases, a showing that the ruling did not beneﬁt all
comparable taxpayers is suﬃcient to demonstrate selectivity. Ruth Mason, Special Report on State Aid
– Part 3: Apple, 154 TAX NOTES 735, 745-46 (2017). Mason further explains that in instances of tax
rulings as general aid, once advantage is shown, the aid’s failure to beneﬁt comparable ﬁrms
demonstrates selectivity. Id.
242 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 216, at 2.
243 Id.
244 See supra notes 57–78 and accompanying text.
245 Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, supra note 13, at 3.
246 Case T-892/16, Apple Sales Int’l v. Comm’n, ECLI:EU:T:2020:338, ¶ 507 (July 15, 2020).
247 See Case T-760/15, Kingdom of the Neth. v. Comm’n, ECLI:EU:T:2019:669, ¶ 561 (Sept.
24, 2019) (joined with Case T-636/16, Starbucks Corp. v. Comm’n).
248 See Case T-755/15, Grand Duchy of Lux. v. Comm’n, ECLI:EU:T:2019:670, ¶ 430 (Sept.
24, 2019) (joined with Case T-759/15, Fiat Chrysler Fin. Eur. v. Comm’n).
249 TFEU, supra note 25, art. 108(3). There are three exceptions, including a de minimis
exception, to the general requirement to notify the Commission of plans to grant aid. Pošćić, supra
note 219, at 494.
250 Id. The simpliﬁed procedure applies to instances where the Commission must only “verify
that the aid complies with “the existing rules and practice.” Id. at 495-96.
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market, or that “serious doubts” remain as to the aid’s compatibility with the
internal market.251
The other types of aid at the initial investigatory phase are misused aid,
existing aid, and unlawful aid. Misused aid is previously authorized aid252 that
the Member State subsequently uses in contravention to a Commission
decision.253 Existing aid is previously authorized aid that may no longer be
compatible with the internal market.254 Unlawful aid is aid granted without
prior Commission authorization, whether or not such aid is incompatible with
the internal market.255 The Commission may initiate a preliminary
investigation into existing aid256 but must initiate a preliminary investigation
into unlawful aid.257 Misused aid requires a formal investigation procedure,
described below.258
Following preliminary investigations, the Commission can initiate the
formal investigation procedure into every kind of state aid.259 Although the
Commission must initiate the formal investigation procedure for misused aid, a
formal investigation into notified and unlawful aid will occur where the
Commission seriously doubts that the aid is compatible with the internal
market.260 The Commission will initiate the formal investigation procedure into
existing aid if the Member State does not accept the Commission’s proposed
measures to render the existing aid compatible with the internal market.261
Following the formal investigation procedure, the Commission renders a
decision with three possible outcomes.262 The Commission issues a positive
decision upon determining that there is no aid within the meaning of E.U.
law or that the aid is compatible with the internal market.263 The second type
of decision, a conditional decision, is issued where the Commission ﬁnds the
EUR. COMM’N, supra note 27, at 1 (emphasis omitted); Pošćić, supra note 219, at 495.
Id. at 1-2.
Pošćić, supra note 219, at 499.
EUR. COMM’N, supra note 27, at 1-2.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 1-2 (suggesting precursory steps the Commission must take before beginning a
preliminary investigation procedure if the Commission wants to abolish or adapt an existing aid
scheme); Pošćić, supra note 219, at 494 (“The Member States have to notify the Commission with
plans to grant new or alter existing aid. However, the Commission has investigative powers and can
act upon the complaint of any interested party or on its own initiative.” (emphasis added)).
257 EUR. COMM’N, supra note 27, at 2.
258 See TFEU, supra note 25, art. 108(2)-(3); see also EUR. COMM’N, supra note 27, at 1.
259 EUR. COMM’N, supra note 27, at 1-2 (explaining that the Commission can open the formal
investigation procedure when it finds authorized aid is being misused and must open such procedure
after the Commission exhausts other investigatory steps). If the Commission seriously doubts that the
aid is compatible with E.U. state aid law, it must initiate the formal investigation procedure. Id. at 1.
260 Id. at 1.
261 Id. at 2.
262 Id.
263 Id.
251
252
253
254
255
256
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state measure is compatible with the internal market, but its implementation
is subject to one or more conditions.264 The Commission issues the third type
of decision, a negative decision, where the Commission ﬁnds the state
measure is incompatible with the internal market and, as a result, prohibits
its implementation.265 If the Member State has already implemented the
measure, then it must recover the aid plus interest.266
The Member State and the aid recipient can appeal the Commission’s
negative decision.267 The GCEU hears ﬁrst appeals, and the Court of Justice
of the European Union hears appeals from the GCEU.268 The courts are
extremely deferential to the Commission’s economic assessments and
primarily inquire into whether the Commission’s conclusions are suﬃciently
reasoned, the material facts are accurate, and the Commission complied with
the procedural rules.269 If the E.U. courts uphold the Commission’s negative
decision, some issues, such as the precise amount of aid recoverable, can still
be litigated in the Member State’s courts.270
B. The Structure of a BEPS-Focused Disgorgement Mechanism
The previous discussion outlined the substantive and procedural aspects
of E.U. state aid law and will be helpful in understanding the similar structure
of the proposed BEPS-focused disgorgement mechanism. The two should
look procedurally similar, but substantively diﬀerent because state aid law is
not adequately equipped to handle BEPS issues.
1. The Inadequacy of State Aid Law to Combat BEPS Issues
E.U. state aid law is an imperfect body of law in the BEPS context. There
may be some overlap between state aid and the subject matter of tax rulings of
which the OECD BEPS Project’s Action 5 mandates exchange. For example,
some commentators have suggested that state aid can sufficiently cover rulings

264 Id.; see also Pošćić, supra note 219, at 497 (“The Commission may attach to a positive decision
conditions and may lay down obligations to allow compliance with the decision (‘conditional decision’)”.).
265 EUR. COMM’N, supra note 27, at 2.
266 Id. An exception exists when such a recovery would be “contrary to a general principle of
EU law.” Id.
267 See id. (“All decisions and procedural conduct of the Commission are subject to review by
the General Court and ultimately by the ECJ.”). If the Commission renders a positive decision, the
aid recipient’s competitors can appeal the Commission decision. See Mason, supra note 240, at 948.
268 EUR. COMM’N, supra note 27, at 2.
269 Mason, supra note 240, at 948 & n.13 (citing Case T-35/99, Keller SpA v. Comm’n,
ECLI:EU:T:2002:19, ¶ 77 (Jan. 30, 2002)).
270 Id. at 949.
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pertaining to harmful preferential tax regimes,271 as state aid covers income
from a larger set of activities than that of harmful preferential regimes.272 But
in general, state aid law would not encompass all tax rulings that deviate from
the OECD BEPS Project Actions and OECD standards, which the BEPSfocused disgorgement mechanism would necessarily regulate.
State aid cannot adequately combat BEPS issues because tax rulings
arguably do not provide a beneﬁt through state resources.273 As mentioned
above, a ﬁnding of violative aid requires, in part, a ﬁnding that the Member
State used state resources to grant the contested measure.274 In tax-related
state aid cases, GCEU and Commission decisions ﬁnd that reducing the aid
recipient’s tax liability below the amount that would seemingly result from a
normal application of the Member State’s tax laws constitutes a use of state
resources.275 In negative decisions, the Commission typically oﬀers little
more than conclusory language that the Member State would have raised
more tax revenue had it not issued the contested ruling. For example, in a
state aid decision involving a tax ruling granted by Luxembourg to the French
company Engie, the Commission noted “the tax treatment granted on the
basis of the contested tax rulings can be said to reduce the corporate income
tax liability in Luxembourg of the Engie group and therefore gives rise to a
loss of State resources.”276 Importantly, as two commentators note, the
comparison between the tax revenue the Member State raised and the tax
revenue that it would have raised if there was no ruling implicitly

271 See, e.g., Faulhaber, supra note 34, at 338 (“[T]he state aid prohibition continues to deﬁne
harmful tax competition more broadly than the FHTP . . . .”).
272 Compare OECD, ACTION 5 – 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, at 19 (“To be [a harmful
preferential regime], the regime must, ﬁrstly, apply to income from geographically mobile activities,
such as ﬁnancial and other service activities . . . .” (emphasis added)), with TFEU, supra note 25, art.
107(1) (deﬁning state aid, in part, as “any aid . . . favouring certain undertakings or the production
of certain goods”); see also Faulhaber, supra note 34, at 331-32 (noting that the state prohibits “using
essentially any tax tool . . . designed to attract everything from revenue and legal ownership to the
location of corporate headquarters and even employment and other activities”).
273 The actual resolution of some recent tax ruling-related state aid cases also produces doubt as to
state aid law’s effectiveness in this area. See, e.g., Case T-892/16, Apple Sales Int’l v. Comm’n,
ECLI:EU:T:2020:338, ¶ 507 (July 15, 2020) (finding that tax authorities had not granted a selective
advantage by issuing tax rulings); Case T-636/16, Starbucks Corp.v. Comm’, ECLI:EU:T:2019:669, ¶ 561
(Sept. 24, 2019) (finding that the Commission failed to show a selective advantage).
274 See supra notes 226–30 and accompanying text.
275 See, e.g., Case C-387/92, Banco Exterior de España SA v. Ayuntamiento de Valenica,
ECLI:EU:C:1994:100, ¶¶ 13-14 (“[T]he concept of aid . . . embraces . . . interventions which, in
various forms, mitigate the charges which are normally included in the budget of an undertaking
. . . . It follows that a measure by which the public authorities grant to certain undertakings a tax
exemption . . . constitutes State aid . . . .”).
276 Commission Decision 2019/421 of 20 June 2018 on State Aid SA.44888 (2016/C) (ex
2016/NN) Implemented by Luxembourg in Favour of ENGIE, 2019 (L 78) 1, 28 ¶ 157; Giraud &
Petit, supra note 29, at 235 & n.14 (collecting and analyzing Commission decisions).
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contemplates the following counterfactual: what would the ruling recipient’s
tax liability have been had the Member State not issued the ruling?277
If indeed ﬁnding that a measure uses state resources implicitly involves
this counterfactual, then the Commission’s negative decisions are misguided.
In ﬁnding that a selective advantage in tax ruling cases necessarily entails the
use of state resources,278 the Commission eﬀectively compares the ruling
recipient’s tax liability to what it would have been absent the ruling holding
everything else constant. However, the proper application of the counterfactual
should account for all the behavioral implications had the country not issued
a ruling, rather than artiﬁcially limiting the contemplated changes to the tax
revenue raised. Speciﬁcally, the Commission and E.U. courts should
determine whether the recipient of the contested aid would have actually
shifted its income if the country at issue had not issued the ruling.
In many cases, considering the full range of behavioral implications for
the absence of a ruling supports the proposition that the ruling never truly
involved a use of state resources.279 As demonstrated, rulings are often the
only means by which a country can induce an MNE to shift its income to the
issuing country. In such cases, absent a ruling, the MNE would not have
shifted its income to the country in question.280 Without the income shifting,
the country in question would not have raised any tax revenue. With the
income shifting, the country at issue does raise tax revenue. Therefore, the
ruling actually increases the Member State’s revenues, directly contradicting
the conclusion that the ruling constituted a use of state resources. Thus, state
277 See Giraud & Petit, supra note 29, at 236 (“Here, the Commission proposes to verify
whether, in the case at hand, the level of taxes raised by the concerned Member State was lower than
it would have otherwise been absent the measure.”).
278 See id. at 235-36 (concluding that when determining the use of state resources, “the
Commission refers to the section of its decision dedicated to the selective advantage, thus suggesting
that the existence of an advantage necessarily entails the use of State resources”); see, e.g., id. at 235
n.14; Commission Decision 2019/421, supra note 276, at 28-29 ¶¶ 153-162 (implying a deviation from
the normal tax system is suﬃcient for a ﬁnding of both selective advantage and the use of state
resources); Commission Decision 2017/1283, supra note 13, at 53-54 ¶¶ 157-62 (using a deviation from
Ireland’s normal tax system as support for a ﬁnding of both selective advantage and the use of state
resources); Commission Decision 2016/2326 of 21 Oct. 2015 on State Aid SA.38375 (2014/C ex
2014/NN) Which Luxembourg Granted to Fiat, 2016 O.J. (L 351) 1, 34 ¶ 188-90 (noting that because
the ruling at issue reduced the Fiat group’s lower tax liability below the level mandated by the
Luxembourg tax system, Luxembourg provided both a selective advantage and used state resources);
Commission Decision 2017/502 of 21 Oct. 2015 on State Aid SA/38374 (2014/C ex 2014/NN)
Implemented by the Netherlands to Starbucks, 2017 O.J. (L 83) 38 ¶¶ 225-28, 78-79 (justifying a
ﬁnding of both selective advantage and the use of state resources because a tax ruling enabled the
recipient to pay less tax than a normal application of the Netherland’s tax system would impose).
279 In some cases, at best, it is ambiguous whether the ruling involved the use of state resources.
See Giraud & Petit, supra note 29, at 236 (“[T]he Commission takes for granted that, absent the
ruling, the revenues of the beneﬁciary in question would have been the same.”).
280 See id. (“[S]ince the beneﬁciary had the possibility to locate its revenues elsewhere, it would
probably have done so absent a ruling on satisfactory terms.”).
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aid law is not only inadequate to handle tax rulings that oﬀer small tax
concessions, but it cannot even combat the most egregious tax ruling uses
because such rulings are prima facie more indicative that the ruling was
necessary to induce the MNE’s income shifting. Therefore, violative tax
rulings, insofar as they violate OECD guidelines and give rise to BEPS
concerns, do not violate state aid law, and, as such, state aid law cannot
adequately combat the use of rulings to induce income shifting.
2. The Speciﬁcs
Because substantive state aid law cannot adequately address BEPS issues,
it cannot provide the substantive backdrop to a BEPS-focused disgorgement
mechanism. Rather, the substantive backdrop of the mechanism should be
derived from three sources: OECD BEPS Project Actions, other OECD
guidance, and the substantive tax law of the country at issue. Generally, other
Actions and OECD work, such as the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines,281
address the various subject matter underlying tax rulings within Action 5’s
scope.282 As such, the OECD has already eﬀectively established the
substantive guidelines for a BEPS-focused disgorgement mechanism through
its minimum standards and best practices pertaining to the subject matter of
rulings within Action 5’s scope. These standards are the ideal source of
substantive standards for the proposed disgorgement mechanism because
their purpose is to counter BEPS issues, and a ﬁnding that ruling subject
matter violates them does not involve the challenges associated with ﬁndings
of state aid law violations.
Notwithstanding the beneﬁts of the OECD BEPS Project’s Actions and
other OECD guidance, the substantive backdrop should also include, to the
extent consistent with such Actions and other guidance, the issuing country’s
tax laws. Rulings that do not comply with an issuing country’s tax laws can
induce artiﬁcial income shifting. Moreover, the OECD readily admits that
notwithstanding the OECD BEPS Project Actions, there is still signiﬁcant

281 See OECD, OECD TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES AND TAX ADMINISTRATIONS (2017), for more information on the OECD’s Transfer
Pricing Guidelines.
282 Action 5 subjects six types of rulings to exchange. Action 5 provides the standards for
preferential regimes and the FHTP’s authority to identify rulings that could give rise to BEPS
issues. See generally OECD, ACTION 5 – 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, ¶ 91. The OECD
Transfer Pricing Guidelines set standards for APAs. See id. ¶¶ 99-100 (using the OECD Transfer
Pricing Guidelines to explain APAs in the context of Action 5’s transparency framework). Action 7
provides permanent establishment standards. See generally OECD, ACTION 7 – 2015 FINAL REPORT,
supra note 134, at 9. However, related party conduit rulings and rulings related to downward
adjustments of taxable proﬁts are not contemplated by any speciﬁc Action item, but rather implicitly
can give rise to BEPS issues as both types of rulings can induce income shifting.
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artiﬁcial income shifting that occurs.283 As such, it is possible that the issuing
country’s tax laws may address issues that the OECD BEPS Project’s Actions
and other OECD guidance do not adequately deal with. In this way, the
issuing country’s tax laws may act as a second layer of defense against rulinginduced artiﬁcial income shifting. Additionally, countries should generally
apply their tax laws, like all other types of law, consistently.284 This
substantive background would ensure consistent application of tax law even
if a ruling deviates from the issuing country’s tax laws but does not conﬂict
with the diﬀerent Actions or other OECD guidance.
The procedural and other non-substantive aspects of the disgorgement
mechanism should mirror those of E.U. state aid law. To that end, the BEPSfocused disgorgement mechanism ﬁrst needs an enforcement arm analogous
to the European Commission. The FHTP is well positioned to assume this
role. Action 5 speciﬁcally tasks the FHTP with annually reviewing the
spontaneous exchange of tax rulings mandated by the OECD BEPS
Project.285 Speciﬁcally, the FHTP analyzes the eﬀectiveness of participating
countries’ exchanges and the scope of the rulings covered.286 In addition, tax
rulings subject to Action 5’s mandated exchange include those that the FHTP
itself determines could give rise to BEPS issues if there were no exchange.287
The FHTP must therefore necessarily be attuned to identifying and
addressing ruling practices that implicate the very motivation of the OECD
BEPS Project: preventing artiﬁcial income shifting and tax avoidance.
Therefore, the FHTP has the requisite expertise to assess rulings and identify
those that violate the underlying substantive subject matter that subjects the
ruling to Action 5’s transparency framework.
In addition to an enforcement arm, there also needs to be an analog to the
GCEU for appellate purposes. The mutual agreement procedure (MAP) is a
possible body that can be tasked with hearing appeals of FHTP decisions.
MAP is the primary mechanism by which countries can resolve disputes
about the proper interpretation and application of the provisions in tax
treaties between them.288 Action 14 bolstered MAP by providing for more
283 See Fresh Insights, supra note 21 (providing data on proﬁt shifting and noting the continued
prevalence of BEPS strategies); see also Finley, supra note 21, at 268 (stating that the data suggest
that the OECD BEPS Project has not yet achieved its goal).
284 See generally LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 59-60 (rev. ed. 1964) (discussing
the just application of tax laws); see also Yoav Dotan, Making Consistency Consistent, 57 ADMIN. L.
REV. 995, 1001 (2005) (“Consistency is undoubtedly a concept of paramount importance within any
legal system.”).
285 OECD, ACTION 5 – 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, ¶ 153.
286 Id.
287 Id. ¶ 91.
288 See OECD, MAKING DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISMS MORE EFFECTIVE: ACTION
14 – 2015 FINAL REPORT 9 (2015) (explaining the importance of the mutual agreement procedure).
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eﬃcient and consistent decisionmaking.289 Also, some countries have
committed to treating MAP decisions as binding on them.290
However, because MAP primarily handles tax treaty disputes, it may not
be adequately equipped to handle all the BEPS issues associated with tax
rulings. Tax treaty discrepancies, especially as they pertain to residence and
PE criteria, facilitate tax motivated artiﬁcial income shifting. The OECD
acknowledges that while the purpose of treaties is to prevent double taxation,
treaties sometimes “allow[] income from cross-border activities to go
untaxed.”291 More speciﬁcally, MNEs utilize treaty discrepancies to create
“double non-taxation, in particular through the use of conduit companies.”292
Action 6 of the OECD BEPS Project directly addresses tax treaty abuse and
the resultant BEPS issues associated with “treaty shopping.”293 Regardless,
BEPS issues in general, and those selectively identiﬁed in Action 5’s
transparency framework, consist of more than mere utilization of tax treaty
discrepancies. As such, MAP may not possess expertise in general BEPS
issues comparable to that of the FHTP. Therefore, the OECD should
incorporate into MAP a distinct subdivision with expertise in BEPS matters
comparable to that of the FHTP.
While the FHTP and MAP apply the disgorgement mechanism’s
substantive standards to issued rulings, the issuing country should be
responsible for collecting the unwarranted tax concessions aﬀorded by the
ruling, as happens under current state aid law enforcement. But because the
OECD BEPS Project is soft law, participating countries will need to enact
domestic legislation to enforce FHPT and appellate decisions. Domestic
legislation is the primary means by which participating countries commit
themselves to the OECD BEPS Project.294 Domestic legislation mandating
the collection of unwarranted tax concessions will ensure that the mechanism
creates the desired behavioral changes.

See id.
These countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Id. at 10.
291 OECD, BEPS FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 6, https://www.oecd.org/ctp/BEPSFAQsEnglish.pdf [https://perma.cc/6E4L-DRDK].
292 Id. at 3.
293 OECD, PREVENTING THE GRANTING OF TREATY BENEFITS IN INAPPROPRIATE
CIRCUMSTANCES: ACTION 6 - 2015 FINAL REPORT 9 (2015). For more information on the OECD’s
approach to combating MNE utilization of tax treaty discrepancies, see id. at 9-11.
294 See DELOITTE, BEPS ACTION IMPLEMENTATION BY COUNTRY: BRAZIL 1 (2017),
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Tax/dttl-tax-beps-actionsimplementation-brazil.pdf [https://perma.cc/KVS8-UTWU] (“The output under each of the BEPS actions
is intended to form a complete and cohesive approach covering domestic law recommendations . . . .”).
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C. Reasons for the Adherence to the BEPS-Focused Disgorgement Mechanism
Thus far, this Comment has argued that a disgorgement mechanism is
necessary to achieve the desired eﬀects of Action 5’s tax ruling transparency
framework and has proﬀered a general structure this mechanism can take.
However, this proposal is eﬀective only to the extent that the relevant
countries—those that issue violative tax rulings notwithstanding their
agreement to comply with the OECD BEPS Project’s Actions—participate.
Adherence to a BEPS-focused disgorgement mechanism would be a large
commitment for those countries that issue violative rulings. Committing to
the prospect of disgorgement is contrary to these countries’ incentives
identiﬁed earlier,295 which is primarily to induce income shifting to extract a
sliver of otherwise unobtainable tax revenue. Adherence to a BEPS-focused
disgorgement mechanism would eliminate a tool these countries use to
extract this tax revenue. From the perspective of these countries, adherence
to a disgorgement mechanism appears to be directly at odds with their current
incentives. Accordingly, adherence at ﬁrst appears to be a rather lofty goal.
However, if adherence can create net beneﬁts that exceed the net beneﬁts
of issuing tax rulings that induce income shifting, then adherence is not only
possible, but in these countries’ best interest. As mentioned, because the
OECD BEPS Project is soft law, a country’s deviation from its terms does
not impose any material adverse reputational impact to the country at
issue.296 This does not necessarily mean that the converse is true. In fact,
adherence to soft law agreements may actually create a material and beneﬁcial
reputational impact to that country. Compliance with international
agreements generally enhances a country’s reputation for being collaborative
and committing,297 and this reputational eﬀect is in some cases a reason for
entering into international agreements.298 Because adherence to a BEPSfocused disgorgement mechanism would signal a strong commitment to
stemming tax avoidance, the reputational beneﬁts from such adherence would
likely be large. Accordingly, to the extent the beneﬁts of committing to a
BEPS-focused disgorgement mechanism exceed the net beneﬁts of
continuing to issue violative tax rulings, committing is in those countries’ best
See supra Section II.A.
See supra notes 193–94 and accompanying text.
See Christopher A. Whytock, Thinking Beyond the Domestic-International Divide: Toward a
Unified Concept of Public Law, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 155, 172 (2004) (noting that compliance with
international law enhances a country’s reputation for “law-abidingness” and thus makes them “a
more attractive partner” to other governments).
298 See, e.g., European Parliament Decision on Resolutions of the Fourth International
Parliamentary Conference on the Environment in Kingston, in 3 ENV’T POL’Y & L. 95, 96 ¶ 15 (1977)
(“[A]ctive participation by the [European] Communities in the drawing up of international agreements
on the protection of the environment can only serve to enhance their reputation in the world.”).
295
296
297
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interest. Therefore, the BEPS-focused disgorgement mechanism may be able
to garner widespread adherence.
CONCLUSION
The OECD BEPS Project is commendable because it addressed many
facets of tax systems that give rise to BEPS issues. However, although the
OECD BEPS Project provided comprehensive substantive measures for
participating countries to implement, tax rulings, in theory, still remain an
extremely viable mechanism to induce income shifting because they allow for
selective deviations from any given country’s tax laws and OECD guidelines.
Tax ruling transparency alone is an inadequate method to combat this
abuse. The support for tax ruling transparency relies on the proposition that
enhanced disclosure will disincentivize the use of rulings to selectively
decrease MNE tax liability. This necessarily assumes that transparency will
decrease rulings’ net beneﬁts to either countries or recipient MNEs.
However, transparency alone fails to do so.
Therefore, introducing a BEPS-focused disgorgement mechanism is the
best way to address the abuse of tax rulings. With disgorgement, there is a
chance that the recipient MNE will have to remit the tax concession aﬀorded
through the ruling. Once coupled with Action 5’s transparency framework,
there will be an increase in the number of instances in which using rulings to
grant tax concessions is no longer viable. Once no longer viable, countries
and MNEs can no longer use rulings to facilitate tax avoidance.
Introducing a BEPS-focused disgorgement mechanism would be a
signiﬁcant feat. It would require a commitment from all participating
countries and necessarily involve partial remittance of countries’ discretion
of their power to tax. But the mechanism’s introduction is not too far removed
from countries’ current commitment to the OECD BEPS Project. The
mechanism would merely enforce the standards to which these countries
already committed. And adherence to such a mechanism may provide
signiﬁcant reputational beneﬁts that exceed the net beneﬁts from using tax
rulings to induce income shifting. Therefore, a BEPS-focused disgorgement
mechanism may be attainable.

